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Abstract 
Neustadt transformed academia’s fundamental conception of presidential leadership by 
arguing that extra-constitutional resources such as strategic persuasion, public prestige, 
and professional reputation are more critical to effective presidential governance than the 
simple application of the president’s constitutional powers.  Professional reputation, 
which refers to political elites’ appraisals of the president as a leader, is a central yet 
scholastically understudied pillar of Neustadt’s theory.  Neustadt argued that the “echoes” 
of a president’s professional reputation typically emerge from the newspaper columns of 
prominent political commentators (1990, p.  53-54).   In essence, newspaper columns 
function as public forums where elites engage each other in interactive dialogue 
regarding their assessments of presidential leadership.  The president’s professional 
reputation literally emerges from the give and take of those public discussions, thus the 
president’s reputation can be regarded as a socially constructed concept that emanates 
fundamentally from a communicative process (Denton & Hahn, 1986; Graber, 1981; 
Littlejohn, 2002). The purpose of this study is to explore through qualitative methods the 
opinion-editorial section of The New York Times in order to discover the thematic 
structure of President George W. Bush’s professional reputation as it relates to his 
stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002.  In accordance to the tenets of Neustadt’s 
theory, this study identified “a dominant tone, a central tendency” in elite assessments of 
President Bush’s leadership on Iraq policy within the specified population of elite 
writings (Neustadt, 1990, p. 53).      
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
On the one-year anniversary of the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 
11th, 2001, President Bush wrote an opinion-editorial entitled Securing Freedom’s 
Triumph for The New York Times. In this opinion-editorial, he commemorated the 
bravery exhibited by countless Americans in the face of unparalleled tragedy while 
simultaneously offering a vision of how America was going to win the war on terror 
(Bush, 2002c).   This op-ed piece was politically significant, because it foreshadowed 
many of the major ideas of his much-anticipated address to the United Nations, which 
was delivered the next day.  In his op-ed piece, he argued that the war on terror required 
the international community to coordinate its efforts to force rogue regimes to give up 
their weapons of mass destruction programs and to renounce their state sponsorship of 
terrorism.   
In his UN address, he quickly made it clear that Iraq was the rogue regime that he 
had in mind when he wrote his op-ed piece.  In the president’s view, Iraq had violated its 
international commitments, reconstituted its weapons program, and assisted terrorist 
networks. The president reminded his audience that the core aspiration of the architects of 
the United Nations, which was founded in 1945 in the wake of humanity’s most tragic 
and horrific war, was to create an institution where states could unite to solve 
transnational problems through cooperative diplomatic efforts rather than resort to 
divisive competition or catastrophic war. He argued that the United Nations had a historic 
opportunity to realize the promise of its founding mission by being the vessel through 
which the international community, as one legitimate and authoritative voice, could 
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demand that Iraq comply with its international commitments once and for all or face the 
righteous judgment of the international community (Bush, 2002d). 
If the president’s argument had stopped here, it probably would not have been 
considered historic given the fact that many nations had long supported a number of 
Security Council resolutions that called for the condemnation, disarmament, and 
containment of Iraq.  However, the president’s words provoked considerable 
consternation among some political elites in the U.S. and the international community, 
because it alluded to a national security doctrine that some regarded as ominous and 
potentially destabilizing for the international community.  Earlier that summer in an 
address to the graduating cadets at West Point, the president had forewarned the world 
that the United States would, unilaterally if necessary, preempt certain threats to its 
security through military action even if multilateral institutions like the United Nations 
did not sanction such action (Bush, 2002b; Purdum, 2003).  The less than subtle 
implication of the president’s words was that the world’s most powerful nation was 
publicly announcing to its international brethren that the United States would not be 
constrained even on matters of war and peace by multilateral institutions like the United 
Nations when it perceived that its vital interests were at stake.  Despite words to the 
contrary by senior administration officials like Secretary of State Colin Powell, the 
president’s willingness to move from a reactive and collaborative posture to a proactive 
and potentially unilateral posture represented a fundamental change of emphasis in 
national security policy that had potentially revolutionary implications for the 
international community (Powell, 2004). This fundamental change of emphasis in U.S. 
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national security policy became commonly known as the Bush doctrine of preemption 
(Purdum, 2003).  
  This study posits that in order for the president’s strategy of preemption to gain 
legitimacy with the general public the president had to acquire a vote of confidence from 
other prominent political elites regarding the president’s capacity to decipher the 
appropriate circumstances and threats that warranted the launching of a preemptive war. 
This judgment is based upon a central pillar of Richard Neustadt’s groundbreaking theory 
regarding presidential power—professional reputation. Professional reputation argues 
that appraisals of the president’s political and public policy expertise by political elites 
who are defined as a unique class of individuals who do business with or closely monitor 
the actions of the president significantly influence the president’s capacity to exercise 
genuine leadership in a decentralized political system that forces the president to share 
power with a network of semi-autonomous political actors, because those appraisals 
influence the way the president’s governing partners do business with him (Gleiber, 
Shull, & Waligora, 1998; Neustadt, 1990). 
The idea that presidential success on major policy initiatives regarding foreign 
policy requires some degree of elite support or acquiescence has been under appreciated 
in part due to the influence, albeit waning, of Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, which 
suggests that presidents have much more discretion in foreign policy than they do in 
domestic policy (Lewis, 1997; Lindsay& Steger, 1993; Wildavsky, 1966).  In our 
constitutional system, a network of interdependent official and unofficial political actors 
must come together in order to formulate, justify, ratify, and implement public policy 
irrespective of its domestic or foreign domain.  Nevertheless, the press and the general 
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public, particularly in areas of national security and national emergency, often grant 
substantial deference to the leadership of the president, when they discern that there is 
widespread consensus amongst elites over the president’s policy and the president’s 
management of his policy.  Due to the public’s limited interest, expertise, and 
independent sources of information regarding foreign policy issues, the public typically 
will look through the lens of the media for cues from elites regarding the wisdom of the 
president’s policy. For the public, the salience of foreign issues and the potential pitfalls 
in the president’s approach to those issues increases when the press begins to highlight 
conflict between elites over the wisdom of the president’s policy.  Squabbling between 
mainstream elites over a controversial presidential policy dramatically increases the 
likelihood that the president and his policy will receive unfavorable press, which could be 
a catalyst for public dissatisfaction with his policy, thus any president has a major 
incentive to garner the support of the governing class when he is pursuing a controversial 
policy on a major or salient issue (DeClerico, 2000; McCartney, 1994; Perloff, 1998).       
 As the president made the case for his policy towards Iraq during the fall of 2002, 
the general public gradually was roused to become more involved in the political process, 
but a number of political elites were already engaged and fully understood the gravity of 
the president’s policy even its embryonic stages.  Elites were the first to study and debate 
the intricacies of the president’s policy as well as how shrewd the president was in the 
stewardship of his policy.  Many of these elite assessments were articulated, 
disseminated, and debated through the opinion pages of the nation’s leading newspapers 
such as The New York Times.   Neustadt has argued that a president’s professional 
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reputation can be discovered and measured in the opinion pages of top newspapers 
(Gleiber et al., 1998; Neustadt, 1990).  
 The formation of a president’s professional reputation is an inherently 
communicative process emanating from the rhetorical tradition, because the president’s 
reputation is a socially constructed entity formed in part through strategic dialogue 
among elites on the opinion pages of the nation’s leading newspapers (Littlejohn, 2002; 
Neustadt, 1990).  Gleiber et al. suggests that the president’s “professional reputation or 
standing is an attitudinal characteristic of the attentive elite, not a characteristic of the 
president himself” (1998, p.  368).  This reality makes the president’s professional 
reputation a receiver-based phenomenon, because the president’s professional reputation 
is the collective perceptions of the president’s official and unofficial governing partners.  
The reality of those collective elite perceptions literally emerges, consolidates, evolves, 
erodes, and or sustains through the interactive and strategic dialogue found on the opinion 
pages of the nation’s top newspapers (Littlejohn, 2002; Neustadt, 1990).  Given the 
interpretive, social, contextual, fluid, and rhetorical nature of the professional reputation 
concept as expressed through editorial commentary, I propose to do a qualitative analysis 
of the themes that emerge from political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials 
regarding the president’s professional reputation in managing his policy regarding Iraq 
during the fall of 2002.      
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Research Question 
What are the major thematic patterns that emerge from political columns, editorials, and 
opinion-editorials in The New York Times regarding President Bush’s professional 
reputation as it related to the initial phase of his stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq 
in the fall of 2002? 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review/Research Context 
Theoretical Framework 
Richard Neustadt in his seminal work on presidential leadership, Presidential 
Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan, 
introduced the idea that elite appraisals of presidential leadership establish the president’s 
professional reputation, which is a core dimension of presidential power (1990).  Gleiber, 
Shull, & Waligora say that “professional reputation is the assessment of the president by 
those upon whom he must depend for cooperation and compliance when he does not have 
full power to effect political and policy goals” (1998, p.  367).   
The president’s professional reputation is so critical to his effectiveness as a 
leader, because in our constitutional system, he must share power with other 
constitutional officers in order to govern (Neustadt, 1990).  The president also must 
compete with a wide array of private special interest groups for leadership over public 
policy (Kernell, 1997).  If the president is seen as weak or incompetent by a significant 
percentage of political elites, then the likelihood that various political elites will 
challenge or resist his leadership is dramatically increased (Kernell, 1997; Neustadt, 
1990).  A president whose leadership skills are held in low regard by his governing 
partners has little chance of successfully shepherding major policy initiatives, particularly 
if those initiatives are controversial. 
 In Neustadt’s theory of presidential power, elites are defined as individuals who 
do business with the president or whose job or status requires them to closely monitor, 
report, anticipate, or react to the president’s behavior (1990). These elites closely monitor 
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and try to decipher the meaning and implications of the president’s communication and 
behavior, because unlike many common citizens, this unique class of individuals 
recognizes in a very tangible way that the president’s leadership impacts their interests.  
These political elites are constantly assessing the meaning and significance of 
presidential choices not only for understanding of present circumstances but also to get a 
reading on how the president will act in the future.  For example, if the governing elite 
detect a pattern of indecisiveness or inability to recognize political opportunities, then 
they might anticipate the manifestation of these weaknesses in future presidential action 
and decide that the president is ripe for challenge. The better the reading they have on the 
president the better they will be able to secure their interests and exercise influence 
(Kernell, 1997; Neustadt, 1990).  
    Elites closely monitor the president for many reasons.  The behavior of various 
political figures is often heavily influenced by their vantage point in the political system. 
The president’s elite contemporaries often, due to differences in their political station, 
have interests that diverge from the president’s interests. Elites have an interest in 
understanding the nature, significance, and implications of those differing interests.  
Secondly, political agents operate in an environment where they must make decisions 
based upon incomplete information. Political agents try to get an advantage on their 
competition by securing more reliable information.  Thirdly, leadership in fact is different 
from leadership in form. The constitution and supplemental statutory legislation dictates 
that political entities collaborate on many areas of public policy.  These dictates outline a 
type of power or leadership in form.  However, real political power is a phenomenon that 
actually decides the course of events or the resolution of a problem.   The power that 
9 
 
 
flows from leadership in fact is a finite commodity that is not easily shared, because the 
advantages that one can accrue from power or leadership in fact by their very nature often 
breed competition rather than collaboration amongst their suitors (Neustadt, 1990).   
The mastery of this tension between collaboration and competition over political 
power is an inexact science that requires an adroit awareness and sensitivity to the 
potential power of strategic communication.  One must remember the “politics is largely 
a word game” (Graber, 1981, p.195).  Communication is so central to the domain of 
politics that some scholars have argued that political consciousness itself is rooted in the 
manipulation of language, since language provides the means to creating a “symbolic 
interpretation of the sociopolitical experience” (Denton & Hahn, 1986, p.50).  Thus in a 
democratic society, public discussion and debate serve as the distillation process by 
which a society or a subgroup within that society discovers how best to govern itself and 
how best to evaluate and relate to its leaders or members.  It is through that public 
discussion that a political community determines its values and how its leaders relate to 
those values.   
 Elites have an incentive to acquire an accurate, comprehensive, and insightful 
appraisal of the president. However, the perspective of any one individual regarding the 
president is somewhat limited by his particular vantage point in the political system.  
Thus, an individual’s perspective of the president can be broadened, enlightened, and 
heavily influenced by reading or listening to the perspectives and impressions of other 
governing elites. Any class of individuals or forum that can enlarge the elite community’s 
“field of vision” on the president’s leadership capacity and performance will play a 
pivotal role in determining how a president is perceived by his governing partners and the 
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context in which a president exercises political power (Neustadt, 1990, p.53). Opinion 
writers in leading newspapers, according to Neustadt, serve this vital function by 
“collecting, synthesizing, and publicly reporting elite assessments” of presidential 
leadership, which in turn facilitates a larger and wider public discussion among elites 
regarding the president’s leadership capacities (Gleiber et al., 1998, p.  368).  Richard 
Neustadt (1990) writes, 
But those who watch a President because their work requires it do not see only 
what he chooses to disclose to them. They see some part of almost everything he 
does with almost anyone, and what they cannot see they try to hear.  Everything 
reported in the press adds to their field of vision. . . .  They ask each other 
questions. They tell each other stories.  They read with care the news reports, and 
newsletters, and syndicated columns circulating “inside dope” drawn from men 
like themselves.  Theirs is a most incestuous community. In consequence, their 
outlook on a President at any given moment will be affected by impressions of his 
will and skill then currently in vogue among observers like themselves.  (p.  53) 
Neustadt goes on to argue, “There usually is a dominant tone, a central tendency, in 
Washington appraisals of a President.  If one wants echoes of that tone at any one time 
one reads Krock, Lippmann, Reston, Rovere, and half a dozen others” [these are 
examples of political columnists from leading newspapers like The New York Times] 
(1990, p. 53-54).  In the final analysis, elite judgments regarding the success, failure, and 
reputation of presidents are largely dependent upon the perceptions of other elite 
Washingtonians.  These perceptions are engineered in part by strategic communication 
from political columnists (Neustadt, 1990). 
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Neustadt’s rich description concerning the formation of a president’s reputation 
clearly indicates that this is a communicative process, because the reality of the 
president’s standing within elite circles in Washington is dictated at least in part by the 
“collecting, synthesizing, and publicly reporting elite assessments” by top political 
columnists (Denton & Hahn, 1986; Graber, 1981; Gleiber et al., 1998, p.  368; Littlejohn, 
2002).   Neustadt creates the impression that the upper echelons of Washington constitute 
a kind of extremely competitive special club, where the members try simultaneously to 
assist each other and gain an advantage on one another by sharing their information, 
knowledge, and insights regarding the expertise and demeanor of the president with 
columnists who have the capacity to accentuate the importance of their comments by 
disseminating them on a grand scale.  Neustadt refers to these club members as the “most 
incestuous community” that “ask each other questions and tell each other stories” thereby 
implying that communication is a central ingredient that integrates and defines their 
relationships with one another (1990, p.  53).  As a result of the interdependent nature of 
their power relationships with each other and the president, one would suspect that 
positive and negative face concerns would factor into the strategies behind their 
communicative interactions with columnists (Brown & Levinson, 1987).  This study 
argues that the combination of these factors clearly indicates that any analysis of the 
thematic structure of a president’s professional reputation would benefit from a distinctly 
communicative perspective.   
The role and potential power of political columnists is due to several factors.  For 
one, the high stature of political columnists within the Washington community gives 
them unique access to the sentiments and the behind the scenes maneuverings of 
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Washington’s powerbrokers.  This insider access allows these columnists to establish a 
vast network of important contacts (Grossman & Kumar, 1981).  Political insiders value 
the information that opinion writers obtain through their vast networks of important 
contacts.  They often believe that the interpretations of president performance revealed in 
these opinion-editorials can assist them in protecting their own interests as they do 
business with the president (Neustadt, 1990).  Some political powerbrokers, including the 
president, will go as far as to court columnists in an effort influence the content of their 
influential writings (Grossman & Kumar, 1981).  
Subsequent scholars have built upon Neustadt’s idea that the professional 
reputation of the president can be discovered and measured in the writings of influential 
political columnists by utilizing editorials as an indicator of elite assessments of 
presidential leadership.  Gleiber et al. (1998) justify this extension of this particular 
operationalization of the professional reputation concept by arguing, 
Editorials articulate the opinions of the newspaper but have the same function as  
nationally syndicated political columns.  It is job of the editorialist to formulate 
and articulate opinions that reflect what columnists are writing at the time.  The 
editorial page is meant to be evaluative.  Thus, editorialists perform the 
information gathering and reporting functions identified by Neustadt.  The 
editorial page is meant to balance political and ideological perspectives, but, 
unlike the reporting sections of the newspaper, no claim of journalistic objectivity 
is made.  (p.  370)   
Political insiders also see these opinion pages as public forums where political 
insiders can directly influence their colleagues’ as well as the general public’s 
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perceptions of the president by authoring their own opinion-editorials.  With opinion-
editorials, political elites can bypass journalistic gatekeepers like political columnists and 
editorial writers. The inclusion of opinion-editorials into the analysis of professional 
reputation makes the analysis of professional reputation less of an “echo” and more of a 
direct representation of elite appraisals of a president. 
The great diversity in ideology, experience, loyalties, resources, and interests 
found in the opinion section of top newspapers often results in a wide spectrum of 
opinion regarding the status of the president’s professional reputation. For the majority of 
political insiders, the range of opinion regarding the president’s professional reputation is 
resolved by looking for overarching themes or a “dominant tone” in the aggregation of 
those individual assessments (Neustadt, 1990, p.  53).    As a result of these factors, the 
president’s professional reputation can be operationalized as editorial commentary in elite 
newspapers  (Gleiber et al., 1998; Neustadt, 1990). 
Empirical Research On Professional Reputation 
  Empirical research using political commentary as a measure of a president’s 
professional reputation is quite sparse. A review of the literature revealed only two 
articles that have used opinion pieces from the media in their analysis of Neustadt’s 
professional reputation concept (Gleiber et al., 1998; Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989). 
 Lockerbie and Borrelli wanted to examine how perceptions of presidential skill 
impacted presidential success in Congress (1989). To assess this phenomenon, these 
researchers created a formula that included three main components- professional 
reputation, congressional roll call votes on domestic policy, and a state of the economy 
index. They measured the presidential reputations of President Carter and President 
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Reagan by doing a “content analysis of political columns appearing in Newsweek by 
George Will and Meg Greenfield, whose commentaries also appear in the influential 
Washington Post” (1989, p.  99). The researchers selected columns that were 
“contemporaneous with the roll calls which will serve as our measures of presidential 
influence in Congress, so information regarding skill that was unavailable to 
Congressmen at the time of voting will not bias the measure” [authors noted that many 
assessments of presidential reputation are flawed indicators of presidential influence, 
because they are retrospective assessments] (Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989, p. 99). These 
columns were used to identify evaluations of presidential skill rather than evaluations of 
the substance of presidential policies (Lockerbie & Borelli, 1989). 
The coders were instructed to score the columns according to a Likert scale that 
rated assessments of presidential skill on a range from 1(lowest score for skill) to 5 
(highest score for skill).  If a column did not comment on presidential skill, the column 
was given the neutral score of 3. The researchers argued that this choice for scoring was 
defensible. If the columnist did not bother to discuss the president, then “the columnist’s 
assessment of the president’s skill is not likely to be appreciably high or low during that 
time period” (Lockerbie & Borelli, 1989, p. 100).  The researchers attempted to validate 
their ratings of columns by providing direct quotations from the sampled columns.  The 
critical finding of the Lockerbie and Borrelli study was that contrary to conventional 
wisdom “extraordinary displays of skill can prevail over contextual factors” (1989, p.  
106).      
Gleiber, Shull, & Waligora (1998) explored professional reputation by reviewing 
3,594 editorials and opinion-editorials in The New York Times from 1961 to 1992. These 
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researchers attempted to distinguish their research from the Lockerbie and Borrelli study 
by arguing that Lockerbie and Borelli wrongly conceptualized professional reputation as 
elite reactions to actual demonstrations of presidential skill.  Gleiber et al. argued, 
“Reputation may be function of, but is not, skill as identified by Lockerbie and Borrelli. . 
. . What a president actually does is less important than how he is perceived by the 
Washington community” (1998, p.  367).  Thus, “professional reputation is an attitudinal 
characteristic of the attentive elite, not a characteristic of the president himself” (Gleiber 
et al., 1998, p.  368).   
One of the things that Gleiber et al. wanted to discover was how professional 
reputation interacted with popular prestige, which refers to the general public’s appraisals 
of the president  (Neustadt, 1990). They discovered that elite opinion is not heavily 
influenced by mass opinion (Gleiber et al., 1998).    
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Chapter 3 
Political Communication Perspective 
 Some might question the appropriateness of applying a communication 
perspective to Neustadt’s theory of presidential power given the fact that Neustadt was a 
political scientist who believed that proper recognition of the interdependent yet 
divergent institutional interests, relationships, and prerogatives between the president and 
his governing partners was the key to understanding and predicting the bargaining 
maneuvers of presidents as they exercised power (Kernell, 1997).  The meaning of those 
interdependent yet divergent institutional interests, relationships, and prerogatives that 
were the focus of Neustadt’s attention, at any given time, is determined by the 
surrounding political context, which is typically defined in large part by the 
communications transmitted by the key political constituencies that make up and or 
dominate that political context (Denton & Hahn, 1986).  In an article entitled Political 
Communication Faces the 21st Century, Doris Graber and James M. Smith say, “The 
field of political communication . . . encompasses the construction, sending, receiving, 
and processing of messages that potentially have a significant direct or indirect impact on 
politics” (2005, p.  479).  Based upon an analysis of the explanation offered by Neustadt 
himself, one can reasonably contend that the communication process itself amongst a  
select group of political elites is the central and defining element in the formation of 
presidential reputation.   The so-called “reality” of the president’s professional reputation 
at any given time “arises from the shared perceptions created when people [in the case of 
presidential professional reputation, these people are predominately political elites who 
author or contribute to political commentary in the nation’s top newspapers] 
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communicate with each other” (Graber & Smith, 2005, p.  490; Neustadt, 1990).  Thus, a 
strong argument can be made that professional reputation can best be studied within the 
“interpretist or constructionist” domains of political communication (Graber & Smith, 
2005, p.  490).    
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Chapter 4 
Methodological Approach 
 Since it is appropriate to research the professional reputation concept within the 
“interpretist and constructionist” domains of political communication, one could 
justifiably argue for the application of a qualitative methodological approach (Graber & 
Smith, 2005, p.  490).  The basic objective of qualitative research in the discipline of 
communication is to achieve a contextual understanding of a given communicative 
phenomenon from the perspective and interpretation of the phenomenon’s participants 
(Guba, 1990).  Contextual understanding is a key element of the aforementioned 
definition. Context refers to “the conditional background or situation in which the event 
is embedded” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  106).   Qualitative research emanates from a 
perspective that argues that the reality and meaning of any given communicative 
phenomenon is a social construction that is shaped in part by its contextual surroundings, 
and thus any analysis of the meaning of any given communicative phenomenon must 
incorporate the context in which the communicative phenomenon “is embedded” in order 
to have the potential of producing comprehensive understanding regarding the specified 
phenomenon (Guba, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Professional reputation being an 
aggregation of multiple, contextual, hermeneutical, and fluid elite interpretations of 
presidential expertise makes this concept ideally suited for qualitative research.   
 This author agrees with Gleiber et al. who argue that “professional reputation is 
an attitudinal characteristic of the attentive elite” (1998, p.  368).  If we are truly 
interested in getting an accurate reading of how elites perceive the president, then we 
need to use research methods that allow those interpretations to emerge from the data 
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provided by the participants. We do not want the researcher to impose his or her 
interpretations on data.  Qualitative research is designed to fulfill that purpose (Maxwell, 
1996).   
 Our understanding of the nature of professional reputation and its impact upon 
presidential leadership is limited, because only a handful of scholars have attempted to 
explore and clarify the meaning of Neustadt’s concept in their research (Gleiber et al., 
1998; Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989).  One could argue that identifying the thematic 
structure of professional reputation in a case study example could enhance our 
understanding of this dimension of presidential power. 
Elites Operationalized 
 Neustadt argues that the professional reputation of a president encompasses the 
collective perceptions and appraisals of elites regarding a president’s acumen in 
policymaking and political strategizing (1990).  This study proposes to examine elite 
appraisals of President Bush’s handling of Iraq policy by reviewing editorials, political 
columns, and opinion-editorials in The New York Times from September 11, 2002 to 
November 8, 2002.  The appropriateness of using editorials, opinion-editorials, and 
political columns as measures of a president’s professional reputation has been 
consistently defended since the founding of the professional concept and throughout its 
scholastic progeny (Gleiber et al., 1998; Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989; Neustadt, 1990). 
Thus, for the purposes of this study, political elites are operationalized as individuals who 
author or contribute to editorials, opinion-editorials, or political columns in The New York 
Times. 
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Data Source Selected 
 The New York Times was selected, because this paper is widely “regarded as the 
national newspaper of record” and political elites from a wide range of ideological 
perspectives regularly read and contribute to the opinion section of this newspaper 
(Gleiber et al., 1998, p.  370; Grossman & Kumar, 1981).  Furthermore, the political 
columnists cited by Neustadt in his original explication of his theory “regularly 
contributed to The New York Times” (Gleiber et al., 1998, p.  370).    
Political Columns, Editorials, & Opinion-editorials Operationalized 
 Political columns are operationalized as opinion pieces that written by columnists 
who regularly contribute to the opinion section of The Times.  The person who wrote the 
column is clearly specified. A column represents only the opinion of the individual 
columnist who wrote that particular column. 
 Editorials are operationalized as opinion pieces that are written by the editorial 
staff of the paper.  No specific name is attached to the editorial as an author, but editorials 
are written with the clear understanding that they represent the subjective view of the 
editorial page board. 
 Opinion-editorials are operationalized as opinion pieces written by prominent 
citizens who have no official affiliation with The Times.  These pieces are submitted to 
the editorial division of the paper, and this division selects which submissions make it 
into the paper.  The author of the opinion-editorial is clearly specified, and the opinion in 
the opinion-editorial is attributed to the individual who submitted it.   
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Type Of Data Selected 
 Editorials, opinion-editorials, and political columns that offered an evaluative 
assessment regarding the relative quality, nature, and significance of President Bush’s 
stewardship of Iraq policy were selected.  The goal is to select political columns, 
editorials, and opinion-editorials that critique the president’s stewardship on his Iraq 
policy rather than opinion pieces that simply critique the substance of his Iraq policy.  In 
this context, evaluative assessments can be positive, negative, or mixed characterizations 
of presidential leadership.  The various expressions of these evaluative assessments can 
be conceptualized as existing along a thematic continuum that ranges from positive to 
negative. 
 Furthermore, the researcher endeavors to select pieces that are predominately 
focused on the president’s stewardship of U. S. policy towards Iraq rather than pieces 
where the president’s management of U. S. policy towards Iraq is just one of many 
concerns.  The researcher also selected articles that evaluated the president’s philosophy 
on national security, because a significant number of elite pieces referenced or alluded to 
concepts from the Bush Doctrine in their evaluations the president’s stewardship of Iraq 
policy (Purdum, 2003). The inclusion of these philosophical pieces will give the 
researcher a greater contextual understanding of the themes articulated in this collection 
of elite writings.   
Personal Review For Data Selection  
 The process by which the researcher retrieved editorials, opinion-editorials, and 
political columns that meet the aforementioned criteria was as follows. The researcher 
personally reviewed microfilm reels of The New York Times’ opinion pieces during the 
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specified period in order to determine the appropriateness of these opinion pieces for this 
study rather than simply relying upon a key word or headline database search that could 
miss good data due to limited or restricted access to New York Times content.   
Screening Words & Phrases 
 The microfilm search started by looking for the any of the following words or 
phrases (and their affiliates or euphemisms) in the body of the political columns, 
editorials, and opinion-editorials- President, Bush, administration, Iraq, Saddam Hussein, 
weapons of mass destruction, war on terror or terrorism, Al Qaeda, pre-emption, national 
security, United Nations, Security Council. This collection of words and phrases was 
chosen because they represent the key players and ideas in this crisis involving President 
Bush’s policy towards Iraq.  
 Screens can add a degree of systematic rigor to a data search.  Some might argue 
that the aforementioned screening words and phrases will not identify every appropriate 
political column, editorial or opinion-editorial that meets the criteria for this study. 
However, the true test for this sampling process is not whether these screening words and 
phrases identify every conceivable appropriate selection for this study.  No practical 
sampling design could meet this standard. Moreover, the validity and appropriateness of 
any screening process rests primarily on its capacity to assemble an appropriate sample of 
writings in a “systematic, explicit, and reproducible” fashion (Fink, 1998, p. 15; Sumser, 
2001).  As long as the analytical judgments of the screening process emanate from a 
logical framework that identifies appropriate writings and allows duplication by 
subsequent researchers, the screening process is valid.  
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Contextual Approach To Data Selection Process 
 This screening process is buttressed by the fact these words and phrases were 
reviewed manually with an appreciation for the textual context in which they were 
embedded. This contextual skimming is labor intensive, but once again it is important to 
point out that this contextual approach helps the researcher to identify good data that 
otherwise would be missed by a simple and narrow key word database search.  
 For an example of the benefits of this contextual data selection approach, consider  
how this approach can help a researcher to decipher the multiple connotative meanings 
associated with words like “America.”  On the surface, America is simply the name of a 
country. However, America can also be euphemism for the President of the United States 
when it pertains to matters of foreign policy and national security.  The President of the 
United States is the head of state, and as a result, he is the government official held most 
responsible by the general public, political elites, and the international community for 
managing the nation’s foreign affairs and national security policy.  Thus, if an opinion-
editorial writer has been discussing his or her critique of the president’s stewardship of 
foreign policy throughout his or her opinion piece and then he or she culminates the 
argument by saying something like “America must abandoned its imperialistic approach 
to international problems,” one might safely infer that the writer was euphemistically 
saying that the president must abandon his imperialistic approach to international 
problems. Sometimes a writer might use president and America interchangeably. 
Sometimes a writer will simply use the word America, but contextually the reader will 
understand that writer is actually discussing the president because he or she will be 
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discussing actions, policies, or pronouncements that require the initiation of or are the 
responsibility of the president.  
 Another possible code word or indirect reference to the president would be 
administration.  Administration officials serve at the pleasure of the president and are 
considered spokespersons for the president’s policies.  One could argue that an integral 
part of presidential leadership involves the management of actions and statements from 
administration subordinates, because as the head of the administration, the president is 
ultimately accountable for people who work and speak in his name.  In short, the 
behavior and rhetoric of administration personnel can be used by political elites as cues 
for deciphering the nature and meaning of the leadership of a particular president as it 
relates to interests of the Washington community. Since the actions and statements of 
administration officials and the president’s direction or response to those behaviors can 
inform elite appraisals of presidential leadership, editorial commentary regarding these 
types of matters and personnel should be factored into this scholastic analysis of 
President Bush’s professional reputation.   
 In sum, a contextual data selection process allows the researcher to recognize the 
direction and meaning of subtle and connotative inferences that are being drawn from 
seemingly innocuous words, phrases, and arguments.  A contextual reading of the text as 
a part of the initial data selection process allows the researcher to garner valuable insights 
into appropriate data for this study and serves as the initial foray into the in-depth review 
process that characterizes this type of qualitative research.   
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Justification of Time Frame- Time Period Between Critical Events 
 The time period for this study falls between two critical events-the one-year 
anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the passage of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002.  The justification for 
the starting point of the time period starts with the fact that President Bush himself 
decided on the one-year anniversary of September 11th to outline his vision for winning 
the war on terror, to foreshadow his policy towards Iraq, which he unveiled in more detail 
the next day in his United Nations speech, and to subtly appraise the choices and actions 
of foreign leaders regarding the war on terrorism in the opinion page of The New York 
Times (Bush, September 11, 2002).  September 11th, 2002 marks the day that the 
President launched his rhetorical campaign against Iraq. The fact that the President of the 
United States used the opinion-editorial page of The New York Times to get his message 
out knowing that other elites would scrutinize his words and respond to his political 
choices supports Neustadt’s claim that the opinion pages of top papers are arenas where 
elites engage each other on ideas and appraise presidential performance (Albright, 2002; 
Rich, 2002; “Iraq Test”, 2002).   
 A preliminary collection of opinion pieces from The New York Times regarding 
the President’s stewardship of Iraq policy during this time period suggests that 
presidential action and comment regarding US policy towards Iraq played a major role in 
generating opinion pieces in The New York Times.  For example, The New York Times 
political columnist, Nicholas Kristof, evaluates President Bush’s skill in using rhetoric 
(Bush’s UN speech on September 12, 2002) to gain international support for his Iraq 
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policy by comparing his actions to the maneuvering of President Kennedy at the United 
Nations during the Cuban Missile Crisis (2002).   
 November 8, 2002 is the day that the UN Security Council made a final 
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to completely comply with an internationally sanctioned 
and supervised process, which was designed to provide a thorough and complete 
accounting of his weapon stockpiles, through the passage of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1441.  Astute observers saw the passage of Resolution 1441 as an important 
turning point in the controversy (Purdum, 2003).   
 The time period between these critical events represented the initial phase in the 
debate over the President’s stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall 2002.  This initial phase 
represented the period where appraisals of the president’s leadership of U.S. policy 
towards Iraq were being formulated and debated in a very public and sustained way by 
elites on the opinion pages of leading newspapers, and as a result, this time period 
represents an excellent opportunity to study Neustadt’s professional reputations concept 
within a politically and socially significant context.  
Paradigmatic Perspective On Methodological Approach 
 The purpose of this study is to identify the major thematic patterns that emerge 
from elite appraisals of President Bush’s stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq as 
expressed through political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials in The New York 
Times in hopes of improving our understanding of professional reputation and the 
meaning of President Bush’s leadership during this controversy.  Insight into what those 
thematic patterns actually are can be stifled, if the researcher imposes a preexisting 
analytical framework onto the text (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Taylor, 1994).   The purpose 
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of the study indicates that this research falls within the domain of qualitative research, 
which is designed both paradigmatically and methodologically to elicit and remain true to 
the interpretations of the participants who are under investigation (Guba, 1990).  
Open Coding Grounded In The Data In Order To Create Thematic Categories 
 There often is considerable ingenuity, range, and flexibility in the coding schemes 
used in qualitative research, because the qualitative researcher as methodological 
instrument necessitates that some degree of subjectivity inevitably will impact the 
execution of the analysis (Guba, 1990).  Nevertheless in order for this research to remain 
true to the mission of qualitative research, the coding scheme should be engineered 
inductively through interaction with and emersion in the text (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Maxwell, 1996).  The mission of the qualitative researcher is to establish a coding 
scheme through empirical engagement with the text rather than through the application or 
imposition of a preexisting coding scheme, which may or may not be well suited for the 
particular contextual features of the universe of discourse under investigation (Maxwell, 
1996; Patton, 1990; Taylor, 1994).   
 This methodological approach to data analysis is called open coding, and Strauss 
and Corbin define open coding as “the analytic process through which concepts are 
identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in data” (1998, p.  101). 
Open coding is a multi-step process designed to reveal the defining features of a text 
within its particular contextual setting.   
 First, the analyst searches the text for defining objects (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
In this study, themes constitute the objects to be discovered.  It is imperative that these 
themes emerge from the data in order to remain true the mission of qualitative research.   
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 Second, the analyst determines thematic designations on the basis of the object’s 
properties and dimensions. Strauss and Corbin defined the difference between properties 
and dimensions by saying, “To further clarify, whereas properties are the general or 
specific characteristics or attributes of a category, dimensions represent the location of a 
property along a continuum or range” (1998, p.  117).  The analyst also examines the 
defining properties and dimensions of discovered themes in order to conceptualize 
appropriate names or categories for those discovered themes. This labeling or 
conceptualizing process typically is rooted in the contextual features of the text. 
 In an effort to keep these thematic categories grounded in the sentiments, ideas, 
and ultimate appraisals of presidential leadership expressed in these political columns, 
editorials, and opinion-editorials, the researcher will make extensive use the words of the 
authors themselves to explain or justify coding or analytical judgments (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998).  This approach will give this study a richness that will allow the reader to 
intimately appreciate the contextual interpretations that emerge from these opinion 
writings.  This proposal posits that this type of inductively designed thematic approach 
will facilitate one’s understanding of President Bush’s professional reputation within a 
specific context and “aid the development” of the professional reputation concept on a 
theoretically level (Maxwell, 1996, p.  79).  
Axial Coding Used To Construct Interpretive Scheme Of Data 
 Open coding allows the analyst to deconstruct the data into its basic or essential 
elements, but in order for the analyst to get an analytic sense of the data’s meaning, the 
analyst must be able “reconstruct” those elements into an “interpretive scheme” (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998, p.  65).  By analytic sense, I mean a conceptual understanding of the 
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data, which requires an analysis of the data that goes beyond simple description.  Axial 
coding is the process whereby the analyst identifies links between categories “at the level 
of properties and dimensions” in order to create an interpretive scheme of the data 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  123).  As this linking process between categories becomes 
more specific and refined “along the lines of their properties and dimensions,” the analyst 
might “construct” subcategories from the data in order “to form more precise and 
complete explanations about the phenomena” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  124). Strauss 
& Corbin (1998) explain: 
A subcategory also is a category, as it name implies.  However, rather than 
standing for the phenomenon itself, subcategories answer questions about the  
phenomenon such as when, where, why, who, how, and with what consequences,  
thus giving the concept greater explanatory power. (p.  125) 
A subcategory has its own properties and dimensions, and due to the interlocking 
framework of data, a subcategory can simultaneously be regarded as a property of its own 
overarching theme (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).     
 Designating thematic categories on the basis of properties and dimensions allows 
the analyst to detect patterns and variations in the data.  As the analyst proceeds with his 
or her analysis, he or she will compare the properties and dimensions of the new thematic 
discoveries with the previous ones in order to be sensitive to appropriate delineations and 
linkages between thematic categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Haley, 1996; Lindolf & 
Taylor, 2002; Potter, 1996; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Vidich & Lyman, 2003).  This 
methodological approach requires that these thematic categories be “linked, either 
physically or by cross-referencing, to the data that give rise to them, in order not to lose 
30 
 
 
the original context from which they developed, a problem often called context stripping” 
(Maxwell, 1996, p.  79).   
 As a point of clarification, it should be noted that open and axial coding is quite 
“different from coding in quantitative research, which consists of applying a 
preestablished set of categories to the data according to explicit, unambiguous rules, with 
the primary goal being to generate frequency counts of items in each category” (Maxwell, 
1996, p.  78).  Once again, the goal for open and axial coding in this proposed study is to 
dissect and link the text into thematic “categories that facilitate the comparison of data 
within and between these categories and that aid in the development of theoretical 
concepts” (Maxwell, 1996, p.  79).        
Selective Coding 
 Selective coding is the process by which major thematic categories based upon 
the context in which they are embedded are synthesized and refined into a “constructed” 
narrative in order to facilitate theory building and coherent conceptual understanding 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.  145).   
 The goal of this research is to discover the major thematic patterns that emerge 
from political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials in The New York Times 
regarding President Bush’s professional reputation as it related to the initial phase of his 
stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq in the fall of 2002. In the process, this research 
will provide some insight into whether Neustadt was correct, at least within the context 
investigated for this particular study, when he wrote, “There usually is a dominant tone, a 
central tendency, in Washington appraisals of a President” (1990, p. 53-54).  
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 This study will follow an adapted version of Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) criteria 
for determining a central category: 
1. It must be central; that is, all other major categories can be related to it. 
2. It must appear frequently in the data.  This means that within all or almost all 
cases, there are indicators pointing to that concept. 
3. The explanation that evolves by relating the categories is logical and 
consistent.  There is no forcing of data. 
4. The name or phrase used to describe the central category should be 
sufficiently abstract that it can be used to do research in other substantive 
areas, leading to the development of a more general theory. 
5. As the concept is refined analytically through integration with other concepts, 
the theory grows in depth and explanatory power. (p.  147)  
Open, Axial, & Selective Coding Are Forms Of Analytic Induction 
 Open and axial coding essentially involves the process of analytic induction 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Haley, 1996; Lindolf & Taylor, 2002; Potter, 1996; Vidich & 
Lyman, 2003).  As the researcher meticulously reads each element of the text, “the 
researcher asks [himself or fellow coders] if a logical connection exists between it and 
any other comment or note” within that text, for his “task is take specific instances…and 
demonstrate how they relate to broader concepts” (Taylor, 1994, p.  275).   Analytic 
induction is as much an art as it is a science, because there is no objective standard for 
making these analytical judgments (Guba, 1990).  Guba goes on to say that the execution 
of this analytical approach will vary to some degree from researcher to researcher.  The 
credibility of analytical judgments derived from this methodological approach rests not 
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on whether a subsequent researcher would arrive at the exact same judgments given the 
same data but rather on the quality of the supporting rationale for those judgments. 
Coding Memos 
 The coding of each political column, editorial, and opinion-editorial will be 
recorded on a standardized coding memo. Each coding memo will record Type of Data 
(political column, editorial, or opinion-editorial), Citation, Thematic Categories, 
Properties, Dimensions, and Comments.  This standardized approach will allow the 
researcher to systematically compare data items as well as recognize and analyze 
potential patterns or characteristics in the data from a multitude of angles and over time.  
These memos will also give other researchers access to the precise rationale for analytical 
judgments. 
 Each section of the coding memo is briefly described in the following section. 
Type of Data- The type of data source is clearly identified.  This section will allow to the 
analyst to systematically sort and compare the thematic features of political columns, 
editorials, and opinion-editorials.  For example, Nicholas Kristof’s Guns of September 
was labeled as a political column. 
Citation- Each opinion piece will be cataloged and cited in APA style. As a result, the 
analyst will readily be able to sort the data by author, date, or title.  The citation will also 
readily allow the analyst to perform a comparative analysis between recurring political 
columnists or op-ed contributors as well as analysis of thematic trends over time. 
Thematic Categories- The identification and labeling of themes will be placed here. In 
an effort to remain grounded in the data, the analyst will often use the words of the 
investigated writers to come up with the names for the thematic categories.  Words, 
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phrases, and entire passages from the text will be included in section in order to support 
and justify thematic judgments.   For example, partisan policy argumentation is the 
thematic category for the words like case, call, and speech. 
Properties- “… properties are the general or specific characteristics or attributes of a 
category” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  117).  For example, evidence was regarded as a 
property of the partisan policy argumentation, which was a thematic category.   
Dimensions- “…dimensions represent the location of a property along a continuum or 
range” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  117).  For example, urgency was considered to be a 
dimension of evidence.   
Comments- This section of these coding memos is designed to provide a forum where 
the analyst can reflectively consider the “range of potential meanings contained within” 
the text in order to determine the appropriateness of the proposed thematic categories as 
well as the exact nature of the supposed linkages between those thematic categories and 
the text (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  109).  This section allows the contextual dimensions 
of the text to be recorded and fully examined.  In this section, exhaustive comparison, 
sensitivity to contextual factors, rigorous questioning, brainstorming, and alternative 
explanations will be employed in an effort to achieve a more thorough analysis of the 
data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
 An example of the coding memo is located in the Appendix A. 
Mode Of Analysis 
 The mode of analysis for this study “is to peruse the entire document” in order to 
identify the overarching theme or themes as they pertain to President Bush’s stewardship 
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of Iraq policy in individual political columns, opinion-editorials, and editorials and 
ultimately for the entire collection of writings (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  120).   
Validity Safeguards 
 Comparative Analysis 
   The process of constant comparison and evaluation associated with analytic 
induction gives the researcher the flexibility to recognize and remedy flaws in premature 
inferences and categorizations in coding schemes (Lindolf & Taylor, 2002; Taylor, 
1994).  The researcher for this study will constantly recheck his coding decisions in effort 
to achieve validity, precision, and consistency in his coding categories.  Such a process 
will help ensure that the researcher detects the critical moment of redundancy, which 
indicates the point where a repeated item can be categorized as a major theme (Guba, 
1990; Haley, 1996; Taylor, 1994).   
 Alternative Explanations 
 More broadly, the integrity of analysis in qualitative research can be strengthened 
by consideration of alternative explanations (Patton, 1990; Taylor, 1994).  This means 
that the researcher seriously considers the possibility of better explanations that are more 
grounded in the data than his or her own explanation. Patton (1990) writes, 
 When considering rival organizing schemes and competing explanations the  
 mind-set is not one of attempting to disprove the alternatives; rather, the analyst 
 looks for data that support alternative explanations.  Failure to find strong 
 supporting evidence for alternative ways of presenting the data or contrary  
 explanations helps increase confidence in the original, principal explanation  
 generated by the analyst.  (p.  462)  
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 This process is analogous to how a college debater can improve his confidence in his 
own arguments, if after a genuine search, he unable to find adequate support for the 
perspective or rebuttals of his opponent.  
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Chapter 5 
Results 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the major thematic patterns that 
emerge from political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials in The New York Times 
regarding President Bush’s professional reputation as it related to the initial phase of his 
stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq in the fall of 2002.  The basis for this research 
objective is rooted in Richard Neustadt’s seminal theory of presidential power, which not 
only claims that the “echoes” of the president’s professional reputation can be heard in 
the opinion section of national newspapers like The New York Times but also that “there 
usually is a dominant tone, a central tendency, in Washington appraisals of a President” 
that emerges from the opinion section of national newspapers (1990, p.  53).  If 
Neustadt’s claim is true, one would suspect that an overarching theme or set of themes 
regarding the professional reputation of President Bush as it related to his stewardship of 
U.S. policy regarding Iraq between September 11, 2002 and November 8, 2002 would 
emerge from a collection of political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials that 
appeared in The New York Times during the aforementioned specified time period.   
 Through multiple in-depth readings of the text, in which the analyst thoroughly 
crosschecked his thematic categories at the substantive and conceptual level in order to 
buttress the veracity of his analytical judgments, a definite mosaic of elite opinion 
regarding President Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy during the fall of 2002 emerged 
and crystallized around a well integrated set of themes.  The broad contours of this 
thematic mosaic cut across a significant number of editorials, opinion-editorials, and 
political columns surveyed in this study to varying degrees of saliency. Even in cases 
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where the expression of themes identified as major or overarching sometimes seemed 
rather latent or opaque, one got the sense through sensitivity to the context in which the 
themes were embedded that these themes were fundamental to elite perceptions of the 
president’s professional reputation.  Thus, broadly speaking Neustadt’s claim that 
typically  “a dominant tone, a central tendency, in Washington appraisals of a President” 
will emerge from political commentary found in the opinion section of major newspapers 
was confirmed in this population of opinion writings (1990, p.  53). 
 The purpose of this inquiry was to document any emergence of “a dominant tone, 
a central tendency, in Washington appraisals of” President Bush’s stewardship of Iraq 
policy, and in an effort to remain grounded in the data and in order to give the reader a 
sense of how the emergence of major themes took place, the results of this inquiry were 
reported by outlining the evolution of major themes from a single article to across several 
articles (Neustadt, 1990, p.  53). The actual contours of major themes regarding the 
president’s professional reputation were delineated by highlighting their defining 
properties and dimensions.     
Overarching Theme 
The overarching theme for this collection of elite writings was identified as the 
following: Substantively speaking, the president made a “forceful” case that Iraq was 
governed by a rogue regime that possessed illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 and in subsequent 
statements, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case that the Iraqi regime 
was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived policy preference of 
immediate preemptive military action.  
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 The first half of the overarching theme signifies agreement with the president’s 
characterization of the Iraqi regime as rogue given Iraq’s supposed possession of illegal 
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), its history of maltreatment of the 
Iraqi people, and its intransigence towards the international community (Kristof, 2002a; 
“The Iraq Test,” 2002; “The Road Map for Iraq,” 2002). The data suggested that there 
was widespread consensus within this elite community about the correctness of this 
specific aspect of the president’s assessment of the Iraqi regime, because virtually no one 
within this collection of elite writings even bothered to challenge its veracity.  However, 
the amount of credit that was afforded to the president by this collection of elites for this 
correct observation seemed to be somewhat limited by the widespread perception among 
the political establishment that the president was stating the obvious (Kristof, 2002a; 
Jundt, 2002).  
However, the second half of the overarching theme indicates that many elites 
believed the president misinterpreted or exaggerated the meaning and implications of the 
Iraqi regime’s rogue posture as it related to American and global security in order to 
rationalize a controversial policy prescription.  Based upon the evidentiary case that the 
president proffered, the president was perceived to have assigned a degree of imminence 
to the Iraqi threat that was unwarranted, and as a result, the president’s perceived policy 
preference of immediate preemptive military action was generally regarded as a 
premature and ill-advised overreaction.  Furthermore, the president’s perceived rush to 
adopt a risky and unnecessary prescription to the Iraqi threat even after his failure to 
empirically substantiate the imminence of the Iraqi threat engendered serious concern 
about the president’s judgment and forbearance (Albright, 2002; Benjamin, 2002; 
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Danner, 2002; Viorst, 2002).  Given its content, implications, and the generally negative 
tenor in which the aforementioned overarching theme was expressed, one got the sense 
that this theme’s adherents had a generally negative opinion of the president’s 
professional reputation.    
Conceptual Category Of Overarching Theme 
The goal of this research was to provide a conceptual as well as a descriptive 
analysis of elites’ overarching perceptions of the president’s professional reputation as it 
related to the president’s stewardship of Iraq policy, thus the overarching theme within 
this collection of elite writings was categorized “under more abstract explanatory terms” 
in order to facilitate deeper analytical analysis of the concepts that serve as this theme’s 
infrastructure (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.  114).  This theme was broken-down into an 
overarching conceptual category, subcategories, properties, and dimensions (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998).   
The data suggested that this collection of elites demanded the president to make 
the case for his policy assessment and preferences based upon empirical evidence and 
sound logic, and their appraisals of the president’s professional reputation seemed to 
emanate from their perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses in the president’s 
rationale (Kristof, 2002a; “More Than One Option on Iraq,” 2002; “The Politics of War,” 
2002; “The Healthy Politics of Iraq,” 2002; “The Illusory Prague Connection,” 2002). 
The content of the theme suggested that the president was perceived to have presented a 
“circumstantial” evidentiary case for his policy that failed to justify the president’s 
diagnosis and prescription concerning the threat posed by Iraq (“A Measured Pace on 
Iraq,”2002; Albright, 2002; Byrd, 2002, p.  A39; Rich, 2002a).  Furthermore, a sensitive 
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reading of contextual auxiliary themes and the language that this overarching theme was 
couched in also suggested the president’s case was perceived to be suspect due in part to 
the undue influence of a radical and inflexible ideological perspective (Dowd, 2002c, 
2002d; Friedman, 2002b; Krugman, 2002b; Rich, 2002a).    
The overarching thematic category was policy argumentation, because the 
overarching theme essentially amounted to the expression of the substantive content of an 
appraisal of the case, rationale or argument that the president put forward for his policy.  
One got sense that many elites perceived that the president interpreted the Iraqi threat in 
part through the prism of an ideology, so ideology was considered to be a defining 
property of the president’s policy argumentation. This property was dimensionalized 
along a continuum of political ideologies.  Ideological policy argumentation became the 
final label for the overarching conceptual thematic category. 
 The president’s ideological policy argumentation was divided into two 
subcategories- diagnosis and prescription. Diagnosis pertains to elite perceptions of the 
president’s assessment of the Iraqi threat. Prescription pertains to elite perceptions of the 
president’s policy recommendations.  Elite perceptions seemed predominately to turn on 
evaluations of the president’s empirical evidence, so evidence was a defining property for 
both subcategories.  The central purpose of the evidence was to shed light on the question 
of whether Iraq was an imminent threat or not, thus the property of evidence was 
dimensionalized along a continuum of urgency.  Unintended consequences were a 
property of the president’s perceived policy preference of immediate preemptive military 
action, and this property was dimensionalized along a continuum of probability regarding 
the likelihood that negative unintended consequences would result from the president’s 
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perceived policy preference of immediate preemptive military action.    A table of this 
thematic category and its defining properties can be found in Appendix B.  
Discovery Of Fragments Of Overarching Thematic Category In Single Article 
The paradigmatic perspective for this study requires that analytical judgments be 
made inductively through emersion in the data and a commitment to accurately report the 
data from the perspective of the investigated subjects (Guba, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  In an effort to illustrate the analyst’s fidelity to rigorous analytic induction, the 
results are presented by demonstrating how major thematic categories were initially 
identified and confirmed in a single representative selection through open coding 
procedures, and then the analyst subsequently explicates the axial and selective coding 
process by which the emergence of major thematic patterns are identified within and 
across articles.   
A September 13, 2002 column entitled The Guns of September, written by 
political columnist Nicholas Kristof as a response to the president’s historic address to 
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, was selected as a starting point for discussing 
the process by which some of the concepts that make up the overarching theme were 
initially identified and confirmed in a single opinion piece, because this column provided 
clues as to how the overarching theme emerged and then consolidated within this 
population of elite writings.  Given the fact that the American political system expects 
presidents to be a catalyst for the policymaking process by offering proposals that the 
political establishment can respond to, the fact that the one of the primary functions of the 
United Nations is to serve as a forum where nations can express their sentiments and 
proposals to their international colleagues, and the counterargument structure of Kristof’s 
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column, Kristof seemed to have conceptualized the president’s address as an important 
policy statement, argument, or case that should be scrutinized and debated (Kristof, 
2002a; Neustadt,1990). From the very beginning of his column, Kristof also seemed to 
have broken-down the president’s address into two subcategories-- the president’s 
diagnosis of the Iraqi threat and the president’s prescription to resolve the Iraqi threat.      
In the first three paragraphs of his column, Kristof (2002a) roughly outlined with 
a few exceptions the basic concepts that served as the cornerstones of the theme that gave 
expression to the dominate elite perceptions regarding the president’s professional 
reputation:    
President Bush yesterday offered an eloquent, forceful and overdue call for the 
U.N. to hold Saddam Hussein accountable. 
Just one problem: He cited no evidence of any immediate threat, no reason 
that invading Iraq is any more urgent today than it was in, say, 2000, when Mr. 
Bush as a candidate huffed and puffed about Saddam but never shared with voters 
any plans for an invasion. 
For months there had been hints about intelligence that the administration  
supposedly has gathered about an imminent threat and about links to terrorism. 
So it was deflating to hear again that Saddam is a monster whose regime tortures 
children in front of parents.  All true- as it was a decade ago.  (p.  A27) 
 In these opening paragraphs, Kristof suggested that the Iraqi regime had a record 
of brutality towards its own people that extended back a decade, thus he indicated 
agreement with the president’s condemnation of the Iraqi dictator as “a monster” (2002a, 
p.  A27).  He signaled support for the president’s “eloquent, forceful and overdue call for 
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the U.N. to hold Saddam Hussein accountable” seemingly at least in part due to the Iraqi 
regime’s record of criminality, however the data also suggested that he parted company 
with the president with regards to the form that accountability ought take due to a 
difference of opinion as to what the record of Iraqi brutality meant to global security 
(Kristof, 2002a, p.  A27).  For Kristof, evidence of cruelty and oppression by the Iraqi 
tyrant against his own domestic population did not constitute an “imminent Iraqi threat” 
to American or world security, thus accountability for the Iraqi regime need not come in 
the form of a military invasion  (2002a, p. A27).   
Kristof’s suggested that his deflated response to the president’s address was due 
in part to the president’s failure to use his address as the forum to unveil the “intelligence 
that the administration supposedly has gathered about an imminent Iraqi threat and about 
links to terrorism” (2002a, p.  A27).  The fact that Kristof’s opinion of the president’s 
address seemed to rise or fall on basis of his perceptions regarding the quality of the 
presented evidence and the degree of congruence between what the evidence meant and 
what the president recommended in light of that evidence suggested that Kristof 
conceptualized evidence to be the infrastructure of the president’s policy statement.  In a 
more detailed conceptual sense, one might say that empirical evidence was a defining 
property of the president’s policy argumentation.    
Close examination of the data seems to suggest that Kristof’s appraisals of the 
president’s evidence regarding the Iraqi threat and ultimately his appraisal of the 
president’s policy prescription of military invasion turns on the level of urgency Kristof 
attributes to the Iraqi threat.  Kristof provides some clarification of what he regards as 
strong evidence of an urgent threat, when he compared and contrasted President Bush’s 
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evidence against Iraq to the Kennedy administration’s dramatic presentation of 
photographic evidence of “Russian missile sites in Cuba” at the United Nations during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (2002a, p.  A27).  In Kristof’s mind, President Kennedy, unlike 
President Bush, was able to extinguish any potential skepticism about the veracity or 
imminence of the threat posed by the Soviet missiles by presenting strong empirical 
evidence of their existence, and he was also able to establish credibility for his 
stewardship by proposing a thoughtful response that was commensurate to the level of 
danger that the evidence indicated: 
 Contrast Mr. Bush’s appearance with a legendary moment at the United Nations.   
 On Oct. 25, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson  
 denounced the new Russian missile sites in Cuba. 
  The Russians and Cuban scoffed that it was all a lie, so Stevenson brought  
 in an easel and blown-up photos of the Cuban sites. 
Where is the comparable evidence of urgency today? 
It’s the Bush Administration that raised the parallel to the missile crisis, 
noting that Kennedy had considered pre-emptive strikes.  Fair enough. 
Yet it is the differences that are most telling.  To begin with, Kennedy 
used the U.N. spotlight to offer specific, incontrovertible evidence of an urgent 
new threat – and then opted not for an invasion of Cuba but for an internationally 
supported naval quarantine.   
“Yes, Kennedy did consider a lot of alternatives, including military 
strikes,” recalled Theodore Sorensen, a key aide to Kennedy during the crisis.  
“But after considering the innocent civilians who would be killed, considering the 
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international law that would be broken, Kennedy rejected that possibility.” 
(Kristof, 2002a, p.  A27) 
In this comparison, Kristof seemed to suggest that President Kennedy had proffered 
evidence of an imminent threat that was stronger than any evidence President Bush had 
proffered regarding Iraq, yet President Kennedy seemed more reluctant than President 
Bush to propose preemptive war.  Why?  The answer seemed due to Kennedy’s concerns 
over unintended consequences.  Kristof perceived Kennedy’s reluctance to be an 
admirable sign of humble forbearance regarding the unintended consequences of war, 
which he regrettably found to be lacking in President Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy.    
Kristof refers to the notion of urgency or imminence six times in this column as a 
benchmark for assessing evidence regarding threats to national security and the 
appropriateness of suggested policy prescriptions for those threats, particularly when 
those policy prescriptions involve the potential of military action.  His column suggested 
that he differentiated evidence regarding the meaning of threats along a continuum of 
urgency.  Thus, urgency was a dimension of the evidence regarding the Iraqi threat.    
Based upon Kristof’s analysis of the evidence presented by the president in his 
address to the U.N., Iraq did not warrant the characterization of imminent or urgent 
threat, because Iraq did not rise to a certain level of urgency.  Kristof highlighted the fact 
that “every president until now has chosen to deter and contain Saddam” (2002a, p.  
A27).  As a result, he appeared to be skeptical of abandoning the longstanding policies of 
deterrence and containment in favor of the president’s suggestion of preemptive military 
action.  Throughout his column, Kristof (2002a) seems to be looking for the president to 
present new and compelling evidence that not only undermines the logical and factual 
46 
 
 
basis of the United States’ longstanding policy towards Iraq but also justifies the 
president’s risky policy prescription of preemptive military action: 
Before launching a war, Mr. Bush still needs to show two things: first, that the  
threat is so urgent that letting Iraq fester is even riskier than invading it and  
occupying it for years to come; second, that deterrence will no longer be  
successful in containing Saddam. (p.  A27) 
 The above passage reveals that Kristof’s aversion to the president’s policy 
recommendation of war was rooted not only in the belief that the president failed to 
demonstrate that Iraq was an imminent or urgent threat but also in the belief that the 
president failed to appreciate the potential risks associated with war.  As one scrutinized 
the contextual meaning of the language that Kristof’s critique of the president’s policy 
prescription was embedded in, one got the sense that risk in the form of unintended 
consequences was what Kristof feared the most about the president’s prescription of war. 
History books, leadership seminars, and policy white papers are filled with lessons 
learned regarding examples of statesman who were undone by their failure to guard 
against the unintended consequences of war.  The fact that Kristof, as the centerpiece of 
his column, made a point to compare President Bush’s strategy in Iraq to President 
Kennedy’s leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis spoke to the depth of his concern 
regarding the possibility of negative unintended consequences resulting from an armed 
invasion of Iraq.  President Kennedy’s acute sensitivity to the potential dangers of 
miscalculations during the Cuban Missile Crisis largely contributed to his historically 
lauded professional reputation as a shrewd crisis manager (Freedman, 2000; Neustadt, 
1990).  In Kristof estimation, President Bush, regrettably, does not fare well in his 
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comparison to President Kennedy, because the president’s articulation of his policy 
prescription demonstrated a lack of awareness for the potentially calamitous 
consequences of miscalculation.             
 President Kennedy was deeply conscious that wars can slip out of control, 
 and during the crisis he read Barbara Tuchman’s “Guns of August.”  
Mr. Sorensen [senior aide to J.F.K.] recalls Kennedy telling aides that he  
 didn’t want future generations asking how the missile crisis had spiraled into war 
 and nobody having a good answer. 
In his speech yesterday, President Bush displayed Kennedy’s toughness, 
resolve, and even eloquence.  But he did not display the other qualities of 
leadership:  humility about the risks of miscalculation, a passion to avoid war. 
 (Kristof, 2002a, p.  A27) 
 Kristof’s column suggested that the high uncertainty associated with military 
action and the possible unleashing of catastrophic unintended consequences should 
temper the president’s predilection for war.  In fact given the high uncertainty associated 
with war, Kristof seemed to believe that a president who can successfully manage 
national security threats without resorting to war should be applauded, and this type of 
presidential leadership should be imitated when possible.  Once again, Kristof (2002a) 
cites Kennedy’s humility, restraint, and vigilance against miscalculation in the face of 
great uncertainty during the Cuban Missile Crisis as a stark contrast to President Bush’s 
approach towards Iraq in the fall of 2002:   
Graham Allison, a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government who 
has written a book about the missile crisis, noted that Kennedy had stipulated that 
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the missiles absolutely had to be removed from Cuba.  But Kennedy turned first 
to diplomacy and a blockade.  He offered the Russians a graceful exit and thus 
saved lives and avoided a dangerous spin into the unknown. 
Today as well, why shouldn’t war be a last resort instead of the first tool 
that President Bush grabs off the shelf?  (p.  A27) 
In light of Kennedy’s appreciation for the risks associated with war, Kristof (2002a) 
speculated about how Kennedy would have responded to the Iraq controversy: 
 How would J.F.K. have handled Iraq? 
 “As a believer in the U.N., he would have done everything he could, with 
U.S. muscle, to get U.N. inspectors in there,” Mr. Sorensen believes.  Such a 
Kennedyesque approach, built around robust international inspections backed by 
the threat of force as a last resort, would also reduce the political fallout of a war 
if it eventually erupted. (p.  A27) 
 The totality of this line reasoning suggested that Kristof believed that negative 
unintended consequences are a likely property of the president’s policy prescription of 
war. However, the president was not helpless, because he could have developed his 
sensitivity to unintended consequences through prioritization and strategic planning. 
President Bush’s professional reputation suffered, because the president’s seemingly 
demonstrated no sensitivity or forbearance regarding potential unintended consequences.   
To Kristof’s disappointment, rather than emulating Kennedy’s resolute yet 
responsibly restrained approach President Bush seemed determined to leap into the abyss 
of war without sufficient justification.  Kristof (2002a) seemed to hint at the possibility 
that the president intended to implement his policy preference of immediate preemptive 
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war regardless of whether he made a case deemed compelling by the political 
establishment or not:   
 Unfortunately, what we still have not heard from Mr. Bush is a compelling case 
 for the one course of action on which he seems  fixated- immediate war. (p.  A27) 
So what is the major theme that emerged from this column? Before this question 
is answered it is important note a few central features of the following explanation 
regarding the results.  In keeping with the mission of qualitative research, the coding 
procedures and analysis of this study were designed to present the data from the 
perspective of the participants, and as a result, the following integrated thematic 
categories and thematic streams of thought are presented in the same synthesized 
configuration as the participants presented it. 
Taken altogether Kristof’s column suggested a mixed indictment of the 
president’s ideological policy argumentation: The president made a “forceful” case that 
Iraq was governed by a rogue Iraqi regime in his speech to the United Nations on 
September 12, 2002, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case that the 
Iraqi regime was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived policy 
preference of immediate preemptive military action.  
  Based upon the evidence and reasoning showcased in the president’s U.N. 
speech (ideological policy argumentation), the president mischaracterized the evidence 
regarding the Iraqi threat by attributing a high level of urgency to it that was unwarranted.  
In Kristof’s estimation, the president failed to recognize or acknowledge the unintended 
consequences that might be unleashed by a premature move to war.  The fact that the 
president “seems fixated” on preemptive war may explain his dubious and potentially 
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ideological interpretation of Iraqi threat (Kristof, 2002a, p.  A27).  In light of these 
deficiencies, the president’s recommendation or policy prescription of war against Iraq 
was unjustified.  
One might reasonably infer from Kristof’s column that he believed that the 
president’s recommendation of war was not only premature but also dangerously reckless 
and irresponsible. From Kristof’s perspective, President Bush seemingly lacked the 
insight, judgment and forbearance necessary to address the policy dilemmas presented by 
Saddam’s Iraq. The content and the overall tone of the column suggested that Kristof had 
deep and seemingly negative misgivings about President Bush’s professional reputation.  
Identification Of A Thematic Pattern Across Articles  
 Broadly speaking, the contours of the thematic mosaic identified in Kristof’s 
column emerged rather evenly across the majority of editorials, opinion-editorials, and 
political columns surveyed in this study.  The pervasiveness of the aforementioned 
thematic sentiment constitutes a general consensus of opinion regarding the president’s 
stewardship of U.S. policy towards Iraq in the fall of 2002 and a confirmation, within this 
particular context, of Neustadt’s claim that typically “a dominant tone” regarding the 
president’s professional reputation emerges amongst political elites (1990, p.  53).   
The grouping of selections under the same overarching thematic heading was 
determined by identifying general correspondence between thematic categories and their 
defining properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  When the analyst detected 
redundancy in the data, the analyst declared the establishment of a thematic pattern 
(Taylor, 1994).   
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Certainly the reader will detect some thematic variation from Kristof’s 
articulation in the following selections. For example, the overarching theme’s 
characterization of the Iraqi regime evolves to include the consensus view that the Iraqi 
regime possessed illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (Albright, 2002; “A 
Measured Pace on Iraq,” 2002; “The Iraq Test,” 2002).  In Kristof’s specified column, he 
alluded to the uncertainties, miscalculations, and negative ramifications that often emerge 
from war without providing much clarification (2002a).  In this population of opinion 
pieces, a degree of clarity about potential unintended consequences begins to emerge 
with a significant number of elites citing the possibility that a war with Iraq could divert 
America and the world from the global war on terrorism (Albright, 2002; Dowd, 2002b; 
“The Iraqi Chessboard,” 2002). Close examination of the data also revealed that the 
expression of concern over uncertainties, miscalculations, and ramifications associated 
with war was slightly more muted in the editorials than it was in the opinion-editorials 
and political columns.   In another instance, the inferiority of president’s ideological 
policy argumentation in comparison to his presidential predecessors was not consistently 
stressed across this collection of elite writings.   
Nevertheless, the presence of the other core elements of the theme specified 
within Kristof’s September 13th column was certainly documented in a significant 
number of these writings, and this fact should become readily apparent to the reader upon 
further review. Furthermore, this type of analysis operates on the following premise: 
. . . when an analyst groups data into patterns according to certain defined 
characteristics, it should be understood that not every object, event, happening, or 
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person fits a pattern completely . . . . This is okay within limits.  (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p.  118) 
 The following excerpts from this population of writings are offered to substantiate 
the pervasiveness of the following theme amongst this population of opinion writers 
between September 11, 2002 and November 8, 2002: The president made a “forceful” 
case that Iraq was governed by a rogue regime that possessed illegal stockpiles of 
weapons of mass destruction in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 
and in subsequent statements, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case 
that the Iraqi regime was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived 
policy preference of immediate preemptive military action.  
  Based upon the evidence and reasoning showcased in the president’s public 
statements (ideological policy argumentation), the president misdiagnosed the Iraqi 
threat. He also mischaracterized the evidence regarding the Iraqi threat by attributing a 
level of urgency to it that was unwarranted.  The president seemingly failed to recognize 
the possible unintended consequences that might be unleashed by a premature move to 
war.  In light of these deficiencies, the president’s policy prescription of immediate 
military action against Iraq was unjustified. The president’s prescription was not only 
premature but also dangerously reckless and irresponsible.   
Iraq Not Imminent Threat 
The initial reaction to the president’s historic address was considerable skepticism 
regarding the president’s claim that Iraq was an imminent threat to America or the 
international community that must be remedied through preemptive military action.  The 
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New York Times’ editorial board in a September 14, 2002 editorial entitled A Measured 
Pace on Iraq remarked: 
 The president made a compelling case in his U.N. speech on Thursday for  
 eliminating Iraq’s unconventional weapons and insisting that Baghdad comply 
with the Security Council longstanding disarmament orders. . . . Mr. Bush, 
however, did not show that immediate action [preemptive military action] was 
warranted. . . . (p.  A14) 
Jessica T. Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, and Charles G. Boyd, a retired general of the Air Force, a fellow of the Council of 
Foreign Relations (a respected and well-connected think tank on foreign policy issues), 
and the president of Business Executives for National Security, in a September 19th 
opinion-editorial entitled Arming the Arms Inspectors challenged the president’s 
characterization of the Iraqi regime and his policy recommendation by offering an 
alternative to both: 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose a pressing threat but not an immediate  
one. There is time to do the right thing and no reason to choose war as a first  
resort.  If the goal is Iraqi disarmament, there is a peaceful means to achieve it. 
(2002, p.  A35) 
The New York Times’ syndicated columnist Tom Friedman expressed his 
skepticism towards the president’s characterization of the Iraqi threat and the president’s 
policy prescription for the Iraqi threat by contrasting them with the threat from Al Qaeda, 
the terrorist group responsible for the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, and U.S.’s longstanding policy of deterrence towards Iraq: 
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First, Americans understand that the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was a 
war of “no choice”- and millions of Americans would have volunteered to fight 
there.  Iraq, however, is widely perceived as a war of “choice.” Yes, Saddam is  
dangerous, but he poses no immediate threat to us and has proved to be deterrable. 
(2002a, p.  13)         
Skepticism Regarding Evidentiary Analysis & Trepidation Regarding Presidential 
Anticipation Of Unintended Consequences 
  A bit of context is needed in order have an appropriate appreciation of the 
dynamic that was taking place between the president and this collection of political elites. 
Al Qaeda, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, was the terrorist organization 
responsible for the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  In the wake of 
this traumatic event, President Bush pledged to wage an unwavering war against terrorist 
groups like Al Qaeda and their state sponsors (Purdum, 2003).  In the buildup to 
confrontation with Iraq, Purdum goes on to report that the president routinely framed his 
policy towards Iraq as part of his strategy to win the larger war against terrorism. 
President Bush charged that Saddam’s Iraq was a part of the infamous “axis of evil”, 
because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties to terrorist organizations 
like Al Qaeda (Bush, 2002a, para. 20). Despite the forcefulness of the president’s 
pronouncements, many elites remained skeptical of the evidentiary basis of the 
president’s policy argumentation and unconvinced by administration suggestions that a 
military campaign against Iraq was part of the larger war on terrorism.   
The president was perceived by many elites to be too cavalier in his promotion of 
his perceived policy preference of preemptive war, and this widespread perception led 
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many to believe that the president was irresponsibly underestimating the dangers of war. 
One opinion-editorial writer went so far as to suggest, “. . . the president is clearly 
choosing not to consider the worst-case scenario at all” (Viorst, 2002, p.  A27).  For 
example in the eyes of many elites, the president seemingly failed to adequately consider 
the possibility of negative unintended consequences resulting from his perceived policy 
preference of preemptive war.  Unintended consequences are the unexpected artifacts of 
policy. A significant number of elites directly contradicted the president by suggesting 
that one potential unintended consequence of the president’s perceived policy preference 
was that a preemptive war with Iraq constituted a distraction rather than a component of 
the war against terrorism.  This appraisal was negative towards the president’s 
professional reputation, because the commentators were deriding the president for not 
anticipating a foreseeable unintended consequence.  
Madeleine K. Albright, who was Secretary of State during the Clinton 
Administration, wrote an opinion-editorial entitled Where Iraq Fits In The War On 
Terror, in which she acknowledged the rogue nature of the Iraqi regime but nevertheless 
refuted the president’s contention that Iraq was an imminent threat that warranted 
immediate preemptive military action: 
The core of President Bush’s forcefully delivered message on Iraq at the United 
Nations yesterday was irrefutable.  Saddam Hussein is a serial liar, a bully and a 
threat to peace.  He has used chemical weapons, and he yearns to impress an Arab 
world that despises him by building a deliverable nuclear weapon. 
The president made a strong case for international action that results in 
either Iraqi compliance with its obligations or the establishment of a new and,  
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 ultimately, democratic government in Baghdad. . . . 
I hope, however, that the president will not be pushed by his hard-line 
advisers into an unwise timetable for military action. . . . (2002, p.  A27) 
Albright (2002) goes on to note some of the evidentiary deficiencies in the president’s 
case and a possible negative consequence of going to war with Saddam-distracting 
America and the world from the war against Al Qaeda: 
It [Iraq] is striving to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, but there is no  
 evidence it has succeeded. . . . 
  Although the president’s speech yesterday was persuasive in many  
respects, he was neither specific nor compelling in his effort to link Saddam  
Hussein to other, more urgent threats. . . .     
 . . . But it makes little sense now to focus the world’s attention and our 
own military, intelligence, diplomatic and financial resources on a plan to invade 
Iraq instead of on Al Qaeda’s ongoing plans to murder innocent people.  We  
cannot fight a second monumental struggle without distracting from the first 
one.  (p.  A27)    
In an opinion-editorial entitled Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda Are Not Allies, 
Daniel Benjamin (2002) who was a member of President Clinton’s National Security 
Council from 1994 to 1999 argued: 
Undoubtedly, Saddam Hussein is eager to procure weapons of mass destruction. . 
. .  These facts provide the basis for strong arguments in favor of removing him 
from power.  But such arguments need to be considered in their own right, and 
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with the clear understanding that attacking Iraq would not be a continuation of the 
war against terror but a deviation from it. 
Iraq and Al Qaeda are not obvious allies.  In fact, they are natural  
enemies.  (p.  A25) 
Tony Jundt, who is the director of the Remarque Institute at New York 
University, wrote a highly critical opinion-editorial entitled The Wrong War at the Wrong 
Time, which argued that even if you believe in the existence of Iraq’s WMD the 
president’s irresponsible comments regarding ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda could 
get America entangled into a disastrous military adventure that not only diverts 
America’s attention from the war on terror but actually undermines America’s capacity to 
respond to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda:  
There is no clear link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. . . ; so advocates of 
a war with Iraq have taken to claiming that such a link can’t be excluded, and 
therefore it should be “pre-empted.”  Few would deny that Saddam 
 Hussein is evil.  And he surely has evil means at his disposal. . . .  But this is the  
 wrong war at the wrong time. . . . 
The worst thing about Mr. Bush’s pre-announced war with Iraq is that it is 
not just a substitute for a war against terrorism; it actively impedes it.  
 (2002, p.  11)         
The criticism regarding the veracity of the president’s contention that a war with 
Iraq was a positive continuation of the overarching war against terror was not confined to 
opinion-editorials. The Times’ colorful columnist, Maureen Dowd, in a column entitled 
W.’s Conflicts of Interest, lamented, much like Kristof did in his column entitled The 
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Guns of September, the lack of “compelling new evidence” and the possibility of 
undesirable consequences for the war on terror resulting from a war with Iraq:  
Mr. Bush gave a splendid speech at the U.N.  He is right that Saddam is a scum 
with Scuds. 
But there was no compelling new evidence [of an imminent threat].  Mr. 
Bush offered only an usually comprehensive version of the usual laundry list.  
Saddam is violating the sanctions, he tried to assassinate Poppy, he’s late on his 
mortgage payments, he tips 10 percent, he has unjustifiable fondness for “My 
Way,” he gassed his own people, he doesn’t turn down the front brim of his  
hat. . . . 
The Bush principle of pre-emption is already being adored and exploited 
by other world leaders who have their own devious uses for it. . . . 
 (2002b, p. 15) 
In this same column, Dowd (2002b) went on to note the worries of Senator Daschle 
concerning the possible ramifications of the president’s recommendation of preemptive 
war on world stability and the war on terror: 
Yet the senator worried that Mr. Bush’s preference for pre-emption could 
wreak havoc on global stability , and he wondered whether attacking Iraq would  
damage relationships with Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Middle East allies  
necessary to root out terrorists.  “Is this now more important than the war on 
terror?” he asked. 
 Does America have conflicts of interests?  Are we fighting one war in two 
places, or are the two wars tripping each other up? (p. 15) 
59 
  
 
From the very beginning of controversy, the editorial staff of The Times was 
extremely skeptical of even the insinuation by administration officials that Iraq had 
significant links to Al Qaeda.  The Times editorial staff framed the issue by suggesting in 
a September 17th editorial entitled   The Iraqi Chessboard that a war with Iraq was not 
part of the war on terror but rather like opening a second front against an entirely new 
enemy: 
If President Bush ends up waging a two-front war against America’s enemies, he 
must be certain that the distractions of fighting Iraq do not divert the nation’s 
attention from its original goal. 
There might well be benefits to weakening or removing Mr. Hussein, if 
the brewing conflict comes to that, but they would not include the dismantlement 
of Al Qaeda. . . .  there is little evidence to suggest that he [Saddam ] and Al 
Qaeda are allies. 
The war against terrorism has many pieces, some of which could be easily 
undermined by a war with Iraq. (2002, p.  A28)   
Columnist Frank Rich reported that more and more members of the president’s own party 
were concerned that the president’s recommendation of preemptive war against Iraq will 
have the unintended consequence of distracting the America from the war on terrorism.  
 The campaign against Iraq, wrote Brent Scowcroft [former national security  
 adviser to President George H. W. Bush] in an op-ed that launched a thousand 
 others, “is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on 
 terrorism.” (Rich, 2002a, p.  A15)    
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On September 28, 2002, The Times ran an editorial that also noted the president’s 
inability to convince individuals like his father’s national security adviser regarding ties 
between Iraq and Al Qaeda: 
The administration has also lately taken to saying that there are extensive ties 
between Iraq and Al Qaeda, a connection that Mr. Bush and other officials did 
not emphasize before.  If the administration wants to make this case, it will have 
to produce better evidence than the imprecise assertions made in recent days by 
top officials like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.  Brent Scowcroft, who was 
national security adviser to Mr. Bush’s father and presently heads a White House 
advisory board on intelligence matters, said in a Wall Street Journal article last 
month that there was ‘scant’ evidence of a connection.  (p.  A16).   
The initial skepticism by The Times editorial board regarding administration 
assertions of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda quickly consolidated and held throughout 
the two-month period of this study.   In an October 23, 2002 editorial, The Times bluntly 
rebuked the Bush administration for, in its estimation, unsubstantiated and unscrupulous 
assertions concerning links between Iraq and Al Qaeda: 
In its campaign for military action against Iraq, the Bush administration 
frequently asserts that it has proof of extensive ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.  
What it has disclosed, however, is unconvincing.  This is no way to justify a 
war… (p.  A22) 
With regards to the administration’s dubious use of evidence in an effort to link 
Saddam to Al Qaeda and September 11th as a means of justifying war with Iraq, Maureen 
Dowd (2002b) offered a column entitled Culture War With B-2’s that literally dripped 
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with scathing sarcasm and open contempt for the administration’s handling of evidence.  
Her comments are directed technically at Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but a 
complete reading of her column indicates that Rumsfeld is basically a proxy for criticism 
directed at the president: 
Mr. Rumsfeld offered sophistry instead of a smoking gun: “I suggest that  
any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th century and still thinking  
in pre-9/11 terms.” 
 Ah, Rummy. Evidence, civil liberties, debating before we go to war . . . 
it’s sooo 20th century. (p.  13) 
The preceding passages seem to indicate a growing resentment, exasperation, and distrust 
of the president and his surrogates for their lack of candor amongst this population of 
elites.   
Bob Herbert, in an October 12th column entitled Dancing In The Dark, provided 
one of the most comprehensive expressions of the growing suspicion, trepidation, and 
condemnation towards the president amongst this community of political elites. He 
begins his column by poignantly quoting the warnings of Churchill regarding the 
unpredictability of war: 
“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that 
 anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes 
 he will encounter.  The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once  
the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.” (2002a, p.  A19)   
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In accordance with Churchill’s sage advice, Herbert argues that the American people 
should be made aware of the potential consequences of an Iraqi invasion.  He writes, “. . . 
the American people should at least have a clear sense of the potentially very heavy 
consequences that may ensue”(Herbert, 2002, p.  A19). However, instead of providing 
this service to the American people, Herbert contends that the president irresponsibly 
tried to create the public perception that war with Iraq would be controllable and easy: 
The Bush administration, with its muscular rhetoric and trumpeting of a new 
generation of weapons even smarter than those used in the gulf war, would be 
happy to have the public think of the war as little more than a walk in the  
park. . . .   
It can sound so easy.  But the truth is that the people of the United States 
. . . are dancing in the dark on this issue.  No one really knows where a U.S.-led 
military invasion of Iraq will lead.  Saddam’s regime can be destroyed, no doubt. 
But what then? (2002, p.  A19) 
In regards to how an Iraqi war would impact the war on terrorism, Herbert asks,  “How is 
it possible that a war in Iraq and its aftermath will not divert attention and precious 
resources from the crucial fight against more immediate terrorist threats” (2002, p.  
A19)?  
The conclusion of Herbert’s column seems to suggest that the president’s lack of 
forthrightness and foresightedness regarding the many dilemmas associated with an 
invasion of Iraq had created a leadership vacuum that had left the public uninformed, and 
consequently the nation was vulnerable and ill prepared to meet the challenges it faced. 
In a world as dangerous as ours has become, questions about the profound  
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implications of a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq deserve much more in the way of  
answers than we have now.  Seldom has the U.S. had greater need for wise  
and candid and prudent leadership.  This is not a good time to be dancing in     
the dark.  (Herbert, 2002, p.  A19) 
Ideological Perspective  
The data suggested that many elites perceived that the president interpreted the 
Iraqi threat through the prism of ideology instead of through a rigorous fact-based 
analysis.  More specifically, the data suggested that some elites believed that the 
September 11th attacks fundamentally altered and perhaps even distorted the president’s 
perspective on Iraq.  In the president’s eyes, Iraq went from a “pathetic dictatorship” 
before 9/11 to an “imminent threat” that warranted immediate preemptive military action 
after 9/11, however, some elites believed that nothing had substantively changed about 
the Iraqi threat except the president’s “own sensibilities after the 9/11” (Kristof, 2002b, p.  
A33).   
In the aftermath of the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a 
significant number of elites insinuate that the president’s lack of sagacity concerning the 
Iraqi threat was due to the rising influence of “administration hawks”(Dowd, 2002a; 
Herbert, 2002).  Administration hawks was a euphemism for advisers such as Vice 
President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who trumpeted the virtues of a controversial ideological 
perspective known as neoconservatism.  Neoconservatism argued that the aggressive, 
preemptive if necessary, use of American power and prestige in the toppling of 
illegitimate regimes like Baathist Iraq ought to be central to America’s strategy in the war 
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on terrorism (Herrmann & Reese, 2004).  Some elites seemed to suggest that the 
president’s increasing fidelity to the ideological perspective of his hawkish advisers was 
reflected in the president’s calculated exploitation of America’s hypersensitivity to 
potential threats following the September 11th terrorist attacks in order to rationalize his 
audacious policy posture towards Iraq (Dowd, 2002c; Kristof, 2002b; Rich, 2002a).  
Some elites argued that long before his speech to the United Nations in September of 
2002 the president “began presenting the proposed Iraq campaign as a keystone of his 
war on terror, an essential battle in a carefully constructed ideological crusade” (Danner, 
2002, p.  A27).    
Many elites were disturbed by the president’s perceived policy preference of 
preemptive war, because they believed that preemptive war was part of a new doctrine 
that marked a stark and destructive deviation from the historical practices and principles 
that America had built its security upon for over a half a century (Ackerman, 2002; 
Danner, 2002; “The Bush Doctrine,” 2002; Wright, 2002). The data suggested that the 
president’s doctrine of preemption was viewed as evidence that the president had drawn 
the wrong lessons from the September 11th attacks, and as a result, the president’s rush to 
implement the neoconservative policy prescriptions of his advisers was making America 
and the world less rather than more secure.  Ideology seemed to be pressing the president 
to adopt a more reckless approach, thus causing the president to misread or embellish 
some dangers and blinding the president to other dangers that he would ordinarily see.  In 
an opinion-editorial entitled The Wisdom of Imagining The Worst-Case Scenario, Milton 
Viorst chastised the president for abandoning time-tested principles and practices that had 
safeguarded the nation against nightmarish scenarios in order to proclaim “a new doctrine 
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for America, the right of preemptive attack, to keep Saddam Hussein from using his 
weapons”:  
But on Sept. 11 we all learned that even disasters can be of an unexpected 
magnitude.  Forthrightness now demands that we gird not for some tepid end to 
our conflicts but catastrophes hitherto unimaginable. 
 In preparing for a war against Iraq, President Bush urges us to overlook 
that lesson.  Categorizing Saddam Hussein as “evil,” he warns that the Iraqis have 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons with which to attack us.  Mr. Bush’s 
concern is justified, though some responsible statesmen at home and abroad 
believe he overstates the danger.  But in suggesting that our forces will dispose of 
Saddam Hussein in a war that is quick and painless . . . the president clearly is 
choosing not to consider the worst-case scenario at all. . . . 
 All our presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, accepted the 
principle of avoiding a war that might wreck the planet.  Mr. Bush is the first to 
question this principle, and his resolve is bolstered by Vice President Dick 
Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, both of whom close their eyes 
to the potential ramifications of a war with Iraq. . . . 
 Is not Sept. 11 a compelling reminder that the steadfast vigilance exercised 
by our leaders for half-century of cold war is wiser than rushing toward a worst-
case outcome?  (2002, p.  A27)         
Policymakers often must make subjective judgment calls in the analysis of 
incomplete information or complex policy dilemmas, but even with this caveat seemingly 
taken into account, the data suggests a prevailing albeit often subtle perception among 
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this collection of elites that the president’s interpretation of intelligence regarding the 
Iraqi threat, the president’s response to Iraqi diplomatic maneuvers, and the president’s 
policy proposals inordinately and suspiciously reflected the maxims and hard line 
remedies proscribed by the president’s perceived ideological perspective (Dowd, 2002d; 
Friedman, 2002b; Krugman, 2002b; Rich, 2002a ). Instead of making his case based upon 
a rigorous and pragmatic analysis of the facts, the president was increasing perceived to 
be pushing an agenda.  The implicit perception that an ideological and audacious 
assertion of presidential prerogative trumped facts, historical precedent, and real concern 
over the possible negative ramifications to American interests and prestige caused 
considerable trepidation and even some indignation about the president’s stewardship of 
policy (Ackerman, 2002; Danner, 2002; Kristof, 2002c; Rich, 2002a; Viorst, 2002).    
Nevertheless, to the dismay of some elites, the president seemingly held on to 
certain perceptions of Iraq irrespective of any countervailing facts, because those 
perceptions corresponded to certain ideological truths, aims, preferences, and 
perspectives that the president forged in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist 
attacks. If certain facts were incongruent with the president’s ideological perspective or 
policy agenda, some elites insinuated that the president’s interpretation of the Iraqi threat 
would either ignore or change those discrepancies.  For example, Paul Krugman, a 
columnist for The New York Times, reported in an October 25 column entitled Dead 
Parrot Society of Washingtonians’ growing suspicions about the veracity of statements 
coming from the White House regarding the nature of the Iraqi threat and the prospects of 
war with Iraq: 
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A few days ago The Washington Post’s Dana Milbank wrote an article explaining 
that for George W. Bush, “facts are malleable.”  Documenting “dubious, if not 
wrong” statements on a variety of subjects, from Iraq’s military capability to the 
federal budget, the White House correspondent declared that Mr. Bush’s “rhetoric 
has taken some flights of fancy.”   
  Also in the last few days, The Wall Street Journal reported that “senior 
 officials have referred repeatedly to intelligence  . . . that remains largely  
unverified.”  The C.I.A.’s former head of counterterrorism was blunter:  
“Basically, cooked information is working its way into high-level  
pronouncements.”  USA Today reports that “pressure has been building on the  
intelligence agencies to deliberately slant estimates to fit a political agenda.” 
 . . . . the Bush administration lies a lot. (2002b, p.  A35) 
The Times columnist, Frank Rich, also noted a growing concern among elites regarding 
the veracity of administration statements regarding Iraqi’s weapons of mass destruction 
program and its ties to terrorism: 
 What we have been getting instead is the one thing worse than no data- 
 false data.  For months, administration officials have been trying to implicate  
 Iraq in 9/11 with the story of an alleged April 2001 meeting in Prague between 
 Mohamed Atta and a Saddam spy.  But the C.I.A. can find no evidence of this,  
 and the 21-page fact sheet the U.S. released with the president’s speech mentions 
 no Saddam-9/11 link at all.  As for nuclear arms, last weekend in his appearance 
 with Tony Blair the president referred to a 1998 International Energy Agency  
report that said Iraq was “six months away” from developing a nuclear weapon,  
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adding “I don’t know what more evidence we need.”  Plenty more, as it happens,  
because an agency spokesman says no such report exists.  This is why those who 
most want to believe Mr. Bush, from a conservative G.O.P. Senate Leader like 
Don Nickles to our allies, keep saying (in Mr. Nickles’s words), “You’re not 
giving us enough.” . . .  
    . . . . there is a widening credibility gap between the White House’s  
marketing of the war and the known facts. (2002a, p.  15) 
Phrases such as “facts are malleable,” “cooked information is working its way 
into high-level pronouncements,”  “pressure has been building on the intelligence 
agencies to deliberately slant estimates to fit a political agenda,” and “there is a widening 
credibility gap between the White House’s marketing of the war and the known facts” 
indicate a perception of a president pushing an partisan agenda or cherry picking 
evidence to support a preconceived ideological perspective (Krugman, 2002a, p.  A35; 
Rich, 2002a, p.  15).     
After all, if a policymaker believed he was preaching the “gospel” regarding the 
Iraqi threat, then you might not expect him to lose faith because of a few incongruent 
facts.  However, Kristof (2002b) cautioned against adopting the military option on such a 
dubious ideological perspective: 
Before we prepare to go to war, we need to take a deep breath and make sure 
we are doing so to overcome a threat that is real and enduring, not one that we  
are conjuring up in part out of our trauma of 9/11.  (p.  A33)   
 Some elites tried to sharpen their remarks by highlighting the fact that Mr. 
Bush’s presentation at the U.N. had failed to convince even some of his staunchest 
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supporters that there was evidence that Iraq was imminent threat that warranted 
preemptive action by the United States, thus, indicating that even some of the president’s 
traditional supporters desired “more facts than sermons” from the president (Rich, 2002a, 
p.  15). Furthermore, the fact that some of the criticisms being directed at the president 
came from his own political base suggests that these criticisms had some reach within 
this community and could not be dismissed as simply partisan attacks. Frank Rich, in a 
political column entitled Never Forget What?, reported: 
Peggy Noonan, as faithful a George W. Bush partisan as there is, sharpened the  
question most pointedly on the Wall Street Journal editorial page on Wednesday, 
when she implored the president to give us facts instead of sermons in making his 
case.  “ ‘Saddam is evil’ is not enough,” she wrote.  “A number of people are evil, 
and some are even our friends.  ‘Saddam has weapons of mass destruction’ is not  
enough.  A number of countries do.  What the people need now is hard data that  
demonstrate conclusively that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction which he  
is readying to use on the people of the U.S. or people of the West.” 
(2002a, p.  A15) 
Given ideology’s presence in the expression of the president’s policy 
argumentation, ideology was considered a property of the president’s policy 
argumentation.  Given its importance to the conceptual understanding of the policy 
argumentation theme, the word ideological was added to policy argumentation. 
Generally, the expression of this apprehension concerning the president’s seemingly 
ideological stewardship of policy towards Iraq was more latent than the above examples, 
nevertheless this subterranean sentiment was detectable to an analyst who was 
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sufficiently sensitive to the contextual conditions in which it was embedded. Therefore, 
this property would be dimensionalized as low to moderate on a scale of saliency 
Second Thematic Pattern  
 The idea that the president made a “forceful” case regarding the rogue nature of 
the Iraqi regime in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 and 
subsequent statements but he failed to demonstrate that Iraq was an imminent threat that 
warranted immediate preemptive military action was certainly the most salient theme 
within this body of elite literature.  However, there was another subordinate theme set 
that emerged from the data, and this second theme set was also critical to understanding 
these elite appraisals of President Bush’s leadership.  This theme set was designated as 
slightly subordinate in relation to the aforementioned overarching theme, because its 
presence in the data was more irregular and subtle.  The expression of this theme set 
tended to be more heavily concentrated and explicit in the editorials and political 
columns and somewhat more muted and sporadic in the opinion-editorials.  As this 
analyst attempted to make sense of these documents through a contextually sensitive 
mindset, he got the sense that the subtle expression of this theme set was due to the fact 
its basic elements were so deeply ingrained in the collective psyche of this community 
that it had almost obtained the status of an a priori assumption, and therefore, this theme 
set was seemingly regarded by a significant segment of elites as a virtual given that did 
not need to be explained or defended. If one takes this view, one could certainly argue 
that this theme was on par with the first integrated theme explicated in this study.    
 On the surface, the president, as commander-in-chief, may appear to have 
considerable autonomy from Congress and other political constituencies in the area of 
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diplomatic and national security affairs. After all, the president has tremendous 
advantages such as direct supervision of the armed forces, access to secret information, 
and the bully pulpit of the presidency over potential political rivals (DeClerico, 2000).   
Nevertheless, Neustadt argues that the political system offers the president’s rivals 
several constitutional and extraconstitutional mechanisms to undermine or thwart the 
president’s leadership in diplomatic and national security affairs, and this ability to thwart 
presidential influence over policy even includes initiatives that involve the president’s 
command powers (i.e. powers that by law and by the Constitution must be respected and 
followed) (1990).    
 Due to the diffusion of power within our interdependent political system, 
Neustadt contends that the essence of presidential power is “the power to 
persuade”(1990, p.  11). Key to the president’s capacity to persuade is his professional 
reputation amongst political elites. Since professional reputation is predominately a 
receiver-based phenomenon, the president’s capacity to shape his own reputation is 
somewhat constrained by the fact that presidential action is interpreted through the lens 
of others’ experiences and interests (Gleiber et al., 1998; Neustadt, 1990). At times, a 
president’s professional reputation can be countervailing force to his own influence.  If 
significant number of elites believes that the president’s actions are inimical to their 
interests or policy preferences, they can punish and even in the most extreme cases 
delegitimatize him in the eyes of some by tarnishing his reputation as a leader (Neustadt, 
1990).    
The conceptual name of the second thematic category was elite skepticism of 
presidential commitment to collegiality and diplomacy. There was considerable elite 
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skepticism about the authenticity of the president’s commitment to pursue a peaceful 
resolution to the Iraqi threat through collegial consultations with Congress and the United 
Nations Security Council before resorting to armed conflict. In fact, a significant segment 
of elites gradually seemed to have coalesced around the suspicion that the president’s 
ulterior motivation for collegial enterprises with Congress and the Security Council was 
to obtain politically expedient legitimacy for a virtually preordained armed invasion 
against Iraq (Kristof, 2002b). The defining properties of this thematic category were 
presidential duplicity, presidential coercive impatience, presidential partisan 
demagoguery, and presidential contempt (see Appendix B).     
Evidence For The Second Thematic Category 
On Sptember 13, 2002, the day following the president’s address to the United 
Nations, The New York Times in an editorial entitled The Iraq Test approvingly noted that 
the president in a “welcomed and important” departure from previous “discordant and 
belligerent rumblings about Iraq from various members of the administration” seemed to 
articulate in a coherent fashion “a preference for working in concert with other nations 
and seemed willing to employ measures short of war before turning to the use of force” 
(2002, p.  A26).  The editorial (2002) also surmised: 
Along with Mr. Bush’s commitment last week to seek Congressional assent for 
any American military action in Iraq, his address yesterday offers the prospect of 
a graduated response to threats presented by Saddam Hussein rather than the pell-
mell rush to armed conflict that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumfeld have been floating. (p.  A26)  
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The president’s collaborative approach gave the United States the moral and political 
high ground in the debate over Iraq by focusing “the world attention’s on the dangers of 
the Baghdad regime instead of the high-handedness of the United States”, and 
furthermore, the multilateral approach forces the president’s critics to “face up to their 
own rhetoric” by offering practical international solutions rather than just negative 
criticism (“The Iraq Test,” 2002, p.  A26).  In short, this editorial characterized the 
president’s diagnosis and prescription for the Iraqi threat as “well put”(“The Iraq Test,” 
2002, p.  A26).   
 Up to this point, this editorial seems to be a rather strong endorsement of the 
president’s United Nations speech and approach to Congress as it related to Iraq policy. 
However, closer inspection of the entire text suggests that the author(s) had serious 
misgivings about the hawkish tenor of president’s prior leadership on this issue.  There 
were disapproving references or allusions to past administration behavior such as “a 
summer of discordant and belligerent rumblings about Iraq from various administration 
officials”. . . . “the pell-mell rush to armed conflict that Vice President Cheney and 
Secretary of Defense have been floating . . . . “the high-handedness of the United States” 
(“The Iraq Test,” 2002, p.  A26).  One must remember that Neustadt argued that political 
elites attempt to discern “the appearance of a pattern” in presidential behavior, and 
“lacking a better base, they tend to rest their forecasts of the future on such patterns as 
they find”(1990, p.  52-53).  The content of The Iraq Test editorial suggests that its 
author(s) was assessing the president’s pretensions to collegiality through the prism of 
previous and in this case contradictory demonstrations (at least contrary perceptions) of 
presidential behavior, and this incongruence, in accordance with the tenets of Neustadt’s 
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theory regarding professional reputation, was undermining the president’s capacity to 
convince the sponsor(s) of this editorial of the veracity or authenticity of the president’s 
collegial approach.  In short, these prior misgivings served as a countervailing backdrop 
to the president’s reported rhetoric that colored current perceptions regarding the 
president’s collegial credentials.  Given the president’s baggage from elite perceptions of 
prior demonstrations of leadership, The Iraq Test editorial opined: 
This will also be a test of Mr. Bush and the depth of his new-found collegiality. . . 
.  Now he must demonstrate sincerity about working closely with the U.N. [and 
Congress] on Iraq, and developing a thoughtful and resourceful plan.  He must not 
treat yesterday’s speech as a symbolic gesture that can be quickly set aside to 
make way for an American attack. (2002, p.  A26)  
Given the context in which it was embedded, the above excerpt constitutes the 
overarching theme of this editorial as it pertains to the president’s professional reputation, 
because this excerpt most completely reveals the intertwining sentiments that serve as the 
centerpiece of this editorialist(s)’s perceptions of the president’s leadership. 
When this editorial is deconstructed into interpretive abstractions in order to 
identify thematic categories and discern conceptual significance, one detects favorable 
allusions to diplomacy’s capacity to resolve this controversy peacefully and the need to 
exhaust diplomatic initiatives before resorting to war. The data suggests that the 
president’s leadership style will be critical to the success of diplomatic efforts, and in the 
case of this controversy, the degree of collegiality in the president’s approach will 
indicate the president’s level of commitment to the diplomatic process.   
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This editorial suggests that the authenticity of the president’s pretensions to 
collegial leadership will be measured by the president’s willingness to honor an 
ambiguously (at least at this stage) defined ethos that underlies collegial leadership.  
According to this editorial, the only explicit criterion for collegial leadership within the 
context of the Iraqi issue is “sincerity about working closely with U.N. [and Congress]”, 
however, the last sentence of the above excerpt suggests through implicit contrast with 
the military alternative that patience is also a criterion of collegial leadership (“The Iraq 
Test,” 2002, p.  A26).  Perhaps more importantly, the fact this editorial suggested that the 
president might quickly resort to the military option implies that there is a suspicion that 
the president, even at this early stage, is not firmly committed to the diplomatic process.  
Furthermore, if the president quickly resorts to armed conflict then this editorial suggests 
that one might reasonably infer that the president’s machinations about his aspirations for 
a collegial solution were a politically expedient pretext for military action.  Furthermore, 
by designating the potential military option as American, one might infer that this 
writer(s) has imbued his critique of the president’s pretensions to international 
collegiality with notions inimical to collegiality like nationalistic unilateralism.    
Thus, in this single editorial, one can begin to trace the preliminary contours or 
fragmentary basis of the following theme: There was considerable elite skepticism about 
the authenticity of the president’s commitment to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the 
Iraqi threat through collegial consultations with Congress and the United Nations 
Security Council before resorting to armed conflict. In fact, sentiment among a 
significant segment of elites gradually seemed to have coalesced around the suspicion 
that the president’s ulterior motive for consultations with Congress and the Security 
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Council was to gain politically expedient legitimacy for a virtually preordained armed 
invasion of Iraq. 
Contours Of Second Thematic Category Across Articles 
  The central excerpt from The Iraq Test suggests skepticism concerning the 
president’s public commitment to engage in a genuine collegial dialogue with Congress 
and the United Nations about Iraq.  The author(s) seems to be considering the possibility 
that the president’s engagement of Congress and advocacy of multilateral diplomacy was 
a duplicitous “symbolic gesture” designed to provide political cover for a preordained 
American military attack against Iraq, although at this preliminary stage, its hard to 
determine the exact nature or configuration of the expressed sentiment without further 
explication of the sentiment’s defining properties and dimensions (“The Iraq Test,” 2002, 
p.  A26).  However, the contours of the theme emerged and came into clearer focus as 
one identified and defined its appropriate properties and dimensions across the entire 
range of applicable writings. 
 The contours of this second thematic category emerged from the data at different 
degrees of salience and meaning.  Skepticism of the authenticity of the president’s 
commitment to pursue a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi threat through collegial 
consultations with Congress and the United Nations Security Council before resorting to 
armed conflict was the most salient and pejorative among The Times’ political 
columnists, as a result, the most negative perceptions of the president’s professional 
reputation tended to be found in political columns.  Skepticism of the president’s 
leadership style and policy motivations was also quite salient among The Times’ 
editorials, however the skepticism tended to be not as pejorative as the political columns.  
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Skepticism of the president’s leadership style and policy motivations tended to be more 
sporadic, subtle, and balanced in the opinion-editorials.    
Presidential Duplicity 
 This body of elite literature on the professional reputation of President Bush 
reveals widespread skepticism about the president’s “willingness to exhaust peaceful 
approaches before advocating war” through collegial enterprises with Congress and the 
Security Council, because the president’s ideological framing of the September 11th 
experience, record, and rhetoric created a widespread perception that the president “was 
just going through the multilateral motions” in order to get political cover for a 
preordained armed invasion with Iraq (Dowd, 2002b, p.  15; Kristof, 2002b; “The Bush 
Doctrine,” 2002; “Testing Iraq on Arms Inspectors,” 2002, p.  A30).  The fact that an 
opinion-editorial by Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld “advocating 
a pre-emptive strike against Iraq was recently pulled from The Washington Post at the 
last minute because of fear at the White House that it might undermine the claim that Mr. 
Bush had not decided the issue”, the growing perception that the president was using the 
war on terrorism “as rhetorical cover” for a confrontational posture against Iraq, and the 
failure of the administration to reveal its “ ‘bulletproof’ evidence of links between Al 
Qaeda and Baghdad” were just some of the incidents cited by critics to buttress their 
suspicion that the president was being “resolutely coy about a decision to go to war that 
seems to have been made” already  (Danner, 2002, p.  A27; Jundt, 2002, p.  WK11; “The 
Illusory Prague Connection,” 2002, p.  A22; Weisman, 2002, p.  WK14).  Even Times’ 
columnist Thomas L. Friedman, who was cautiously supportive of the strategic 
underpinnings of the president’s policy towards Iraq, reported that the president’s 
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leadership was being undermined by the growing suspicion that the president’s 
aggressive stance and diplomatic stipulations towards Iraq were designed to make it 
virtually impossible for Saddam Hussein to say yes to a diplomatic solution in a face 
saving manner, thus the president through duplicitous means was perceived to be creating 
a pretext for military action (2002b).  In sum, there seemed to be a general sense within 
this literature that the president’s policy towards Iraq bifurcated along a public tract that 
emphasized collegiality, diplomacy, and dubious assertions regarding Iraq’s place in the 
war on terrorism and a private tract that emphasized belligerency, unilateralism, and 
militaristic proclivities, and the prevailing suspicion seemed to be that president’s public 
efforts were primarily a means to put a more attractive face on a controversial yet 
controlling private policy (Dowd, 2002c, 2002d; Kristof, 2002c).  
         Some elites believed that the president was antagonistic to collegial enterprises, 
because he was more inclined to dictate or direct policy than debate or negotiate policy.  
For instance, The Times’ columnist, Maureen Dowd, scoffed at the president’s 
pretensions to collegial leadership, because she claimed that the president suffered from 
an “alpha girl” mentality that caused the president to delude himself into believing that 
“leadership was all about him” (2002d, p.  A21). She believed that the president deep 
down did not like “a lot meddling from know-nothings in Congress” on the Iraq issue 
(2002b, p.  15).  The president only “feigned interest in negotiation” in order to placate 
members of Congress who expressed trepidation about military action against Iraq 
(Dowd, 2002e, p.  13). In reality, Dowd (2002d) claimed that a duplicitous strategy 
designed to undermine any potential diplomatic solution to the Iraqi threat was in the 
works: 
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 Mr. Bush said he needed Congressional support to win at the U.N., but he wants 
 to fail at the U.N. so he can install his own MacArthur as viceroy of Iraq. (p.  13)  
 Dowd (2002c) went so far as to brazenly liken the president’s attitude towards 
consultations with Congress and the Security Council to untoward chicanery by some 
teens on prom night when she wrote:  
As my girlfriend Dana said: “Bush is like the guy who reserves a hotel room and 
then asks you to the prom.” (p.  13) 
In other words, the debate about the proper course of action was academic, because the 
president had already made up his mind.  Dowd believed that there could be no doubt that 
the president and the hawks within his administration were using diplomacy to create a 
politically expedient pretext for the military invasion once the president began to move 
sizeable numbers of troops to the Gulf region: 
As the Pentagon moves troops, carriers, covert agents and B-2 bombers into the 
Persian Gulf, the president, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld continue 
 their pantomime of consultation.  (2002c, p. 13)  
 
The warriors gave a raspberry to the U.N., making it obvious that Mr. Bush was 
 just going through the multilateral motions by revealing that Gen. Tommy Franks 
 is moving the U.S. Central Command from Tampa to Qatar to get ready for a war  
 against Iraq.  (2002b, p.  15)   
Dowd was a part of a fairly large contingent of elites who expressed the view that 
the president was manipulating the diplomatic process in order to manufacture “an excuse 
to go war” that the American public, Congress, and the international community would 
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regard as legitimate (“A Delicate Balance at the U.N., 2002, p.  12). Columnist Frank 
Rich saw the president’s strategy towards consultations with Congress and the Security 
Council as a replay of a previous duplicitous game plan where the president “would do 
pretty much what he always intended after a few weeks of ostentatious 
‘listening’”(2002a, p.  A15). Columnist Bill Keller claimed the “consensus” view among 
Russians was that “the Bush overtures to the U.N. are laughably insincere, a belated 
effort to dress up an attack that is foreordained” (2002, p.  A19).  Jessica T. Mathews, 
president of the Carnegie Endowment of Peace, and retired Air Force general Charles G. 
Boyd predicted, “Soon the United States will declare the whole exercise [diplomatic 
negotiations at the United Nations Security Council] a failure and invade Iraq” (2002, p.  
A35).        
Even on the doorstep of achieving a widely perceived diplomatic triumph at the 
Security Council in the form of a tough new resolution (i.e. United Nations Resolution 
1441) that demanded immediate Iraqi compliance with previous United Nations’ 
disarmament orders, a significant contingent elites shared the fear that the president’s 
lack of faith in diplomacy as an ultimate solution would eventually “tempt” the president, 
despite the potential consequences, to sabotage or prematurely jettison the diplomatic 
process. In a column entitled Be Careful What You Ask For, Nicholas D. Kristof (2002b) 
gave voice to this elite unease with the president’s belligerent proclivities and forewarned 
his contemporaries of the national suffering that could potentially ensue from the 
president’s shortsighted leadership when he wrote: 
Mr. Bush’s problem is that he has launched a diplomatic process in which he has 
little faith.  The reality is that he went to the U.N. to get international legitimacy, 
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not weapons inspection. So he may soon be tempted to short-circuit the 
diplomatic process. 
The resolution, as it is presently drafted, requires Saddam Hussein to make 
a full declaration of his secret programs within 30 days.  It’s a good bet that 
there’ll be a lot of doubt that his declaration is completely truthful, and so hawks 
will encourage Mr. Bush to launch a war at that time. . . . 
If that happens, we could be at war by year’s end.  We may be paying for 
such hubris for years to come. (p. A31) 
Dimension- Speculation Versus Empirical Documentation 
The duplicity property attempts to capture the degree of disagreement or 
dissonance that elites perceive between the president’s publicly articulated policy towards 
Iraq and what was perceived to be his private or actual policy towards Iraq. The property 
was dimensionalized along the basis of speculation versus empirical documentation.  This 
rating scale was based upon the assumption that an evaluating elite commentator 
probably would have a higher degree of certainty about the president’s duplicity, if he or 
she was willing cite or document specific demonstrations of presidential duplicity. This 
rating scale was also based upon the assumption that this community of elites would 
assign higher degrees of confidence and weight to observations by their colleagues that 
could be empirically documented versus observations by their colleagues that amounted 
to mere speculation, thus making perceptions based upon empirical documentation more 
influential in the determination of the president’s professional reputation than perceptions 
based primarily upon speculation.   
82 
  
 
Given the inherently speculative nature of elite appraisals, one could argue that 
the speculation/empirical documentation dichotomy is not a good way to dimensionalize 
this property.  However, this analyst would argue that the presence or absence of 
empirical documentation fundamentally altered the nature of the appraisal, because 
empirical documentation in comparison to undocumented speculation introduces more 
stringent notions regarding the verification or falsification of data. Furthermore, the 
empirical documentation designation includes appraisals that speculate at least to a 
significant degree on the basis of empirical documentation, while the speculation 
designation is reserved for appraisals that are totally or primarily based upon 
undocumented speculation.  Thus, judgments regarding appropriate designations for 
appraisals were determined by the presence or absence of empirical documentation and 
by the context in which the appraisal was embedded.  With these caveats, this analyst 
reasoned that the speculation/empirical dichotomy was a good way to differentiate or 
dimensionalize this property along a substantive continuum.  
If an elite commentator documented dissonance within the president’s policy with 
specific references to evidence then this opinion was generally designated as empirical 
documentation on the duplicity scale.  Thus, when The Times’ columnist Maureen Dowd 
referenced troop movements to the Gulf as evidence of the president’s insincere 
“pantomime of consultation,” this excerpt was given a score of empirical documentation 
on the duplicity scale (2002b, p.  A21).  If an elite commentator simply referenced 
perceived dissonance in the president’s thinking or strategy about his policy, then this 
opinion was generally rated as speculative on the duplicity scale.  Thus, when The Times’ 
columnist Nicholas Kristof couched his speculation that the president “has launched a 
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diplomatic process in which he has little faith” in language that is matter-of-fact but no 
specific documentation is offered to buttress his speculation, the analyst for this study 
believed that this example warranted a designation of speculation  (2002b, p.  A31).  
Presidential Coercive Impatience 
In the editorial entitled A Measured Pace on Iraq, which appeared in The Times 
the day after the aforementioned The Iraq Test editorial, one detects a noticeable increase 
in the skepticism directed at the president’s supposedly collegial approach to the Iraqi 
threat based upon the perception of presidential impatience with the deliberations of his 
interlocutors at the United Nations Security Council and Congress.   
 Mr. Bush was already sounding impatient yesterday, just a day after his address to  
 the U.N. Unless the president has evidence indicating that Iraq is on the brink of  
 fabricating nuclear weapons, he would be well advised to give the Security  
Council and Congress ample time to deliberate.  He will only undermine support 
for his policy if he tries to stampede everyone into action.   
(“A Measured Pace,” 2002, p.  A14)     
In the above excerpt, the president was warned about the potential negative ramifications 
for his policy and leadership if his impatience persists, and in the closing paragraph of 
this editorial, the warning was reiterated in distinctly more blunt language that also 
introduced a veiled allusion to presidential coercion. 
  If he [the president] expects to gain domestic and foreign backing for dealing with 
 Iraq, he will need to treat Congress and the U.N. Security Council as partners and  
 not as mere compliant bodies that can be bludgeoned into acting.   
 (“A Measured Pace,” 2002, p.  A14)  
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 In an editorial entitled The Road Map for Iraq for September 18, 2002 edition of 
The Times, the president was characterized as “pressing the U.N. toward a showdown 
with the Hussein regime” (2002, p.  A30).  The editorial also noted the president’s 
skepticism of the deliberations at the Security Council regarding a new resolution against 
Iraq, which in turn highlighted elite skepticism about the president’s commitment to a 
collegial leadership on this controversial issue. The editorial also chastised the president 
for his impatience with diplomacy and his coercive proclivities. 
  The Bush administration fears that sequential votes could lead to a stalemate, but  
 if Washington is serious about working with other nations to restrain Iraq, it 
 can’t expect to dictate every move to the U.N. (“The Road Map for Iraq,” 2002, p.    
 A30) 
In an October 10, 2002 opinion-editorial entitled Congress Must Resist the Rush 
to War, Democratic Senator from West Virginia, Robert C. Byrd, seemingly in a fit 
exasperation condemned the Congress for abdicating its constitutional prerogatives and 
responsibilities in the face of “absurd” presidential impatience and pressure, and thus, by 
implication he seemingly was condemning the president for adopting an impatient and 
antagonistic approach to Congress that was inimical to facilitating the “due deliberation” 
regarding “the president’s use-of-force resolution” that the constitution required and 
American people deserved: 
How have we gotten to this low point in the history of Congress?  Are we too 
feeble to resist the demands of a president who is determined to bend the 
collective will of Congress to his will . . . .  And why are we allowing the 
executive to rush our decision-making right before an election?  Congress, under 
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pressure from the executive branch, should not hand away its Constitutional 
powers.  (p.  A39) 
Dimension 
 The property of presidential coercive impatience achieved a high degree of 
salience within collection of elite opinion writings.  This property predominately was 
couched in emphatic language that suggested a high degree of presidential coercive 
impatience, and as result, the overall dimensional characterization for this collection of 
elite writing was high presidential coercive impatience. 
Partisan Demagoguery 
The next property centers upon the concept of partisan demagoguery.  Partisan 
demagoguery was defined as the fervent advancement of mores, objectives, and ideals 
associated with president’s agenda, ideology or party through strategies designed to 
consolidate the president’s political position and “to foment political divisions” or 
marginalization among the president’s rivals (Davidson & Oleszek, 2004, p. 187).   
The editorial board of The Times made perhaps its most explicit rebuke of the 
president’s leadership when it charged that the president was unabashedly contributing to 
a corrosive atmosphere surrounding Congress’s deliberations regarding Iraq.  In the 
estimation of The Times, the president greatly undermined the legislature’s capacity to 
honor its “solemn obligation in our constitutional system to weigh issues of war and 
peace . . . as free from partisanship as possible” by calling the patriotism of dissenters 
into question (“The Politics of War,” 2002, p.  A26; “The Healthy Politics of Iraq,” 
2002).  In a seemingly selfish effort to gain “political advantage”, the president’s partisan 
demagoguery not only negatively impinged upon the prerogatives of Congress but 
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threaten to “severely damage the body politic” by taking a divide nation to war (“A 
Nation Wary of War,” 2002, p.  A30).   
In an editorial entitled The Healthy Politics of Iraq, The Times’ editorial board 
articulated a rather nuanced argument regarding presidential partisanship. Partisanship 
itself was not necessarily corrosive to the debate, but presidential partisanship that 
devolved into partisan demagoguery that sanctioned attacks against the patriotism or 
integrity of skeptics who raise questions about the president’s stewardship of diplomatic 
efforts or policy prescriptions represented a dereliction of presidential duty.   
 President Bush and the Democrats in Congress are suddenly in meltdown mode 
over the issue of who is playing politics on the eve of a possible war with Iraq.  
Mr. Bush has begun using the campaign against terrorism in his stump speeches,  
declaring that Democrats are “not interested in the security of the American 
people”. . . . None of this is unhealthy. We just wish all of this intensity was being 
directed at the issue of Iraq instead of people’s political motives. . . . 
 . . . . The Bush administration has to recognize the legitimate concerns of 
lawmakers who do not want to give the president a blank check to wage war 
wherever he wants in a region and without any initial steps being taken to try to 
avoid a conflict.  Casting slurs on the patriotism of anyone who raises a question 
is unfair and borders on un-American.  (“The Healthy Politics of Iraq,” 2002, p.  
A28) 
 The perception that the president irresponsibly questioned the patriotism of 
dissenters was not confined to The Times’ editorial board.  Columnist Frank Rich wrote, 
“To question the president on Iraq is an invitation to have one’s patriotism 
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besmirched”(2002a, p. A15).  In an opinion-editorial entitled Defend the Country, Not the 
Party, Democratic House minority leader Richard Gephardt expanded the critique by 
arguing that presidential besmirchment of the patriotism of dissenters was part a 
calculated and cynical campaign to market the war “to the G.O.P.’s advantage in the 
2002 elections” (2002, p.  A31).  Essentially by rebuking the president for making 
support or disagreement with the president’s Iraqi policy a referendum on a person’s 
fitness for elective office and patriotism, Gephardt (2002) argued that the president’s 
partisan demagoguery was not only distasteful but also potentially tragically shortsighted, 
because the president’s partisan actions and divisive rhetoric were unnecessarily 
undermining the bipartisan support essential to any long term resolution of the Iraqi 
crisis:     
President Bush himself has decided to play politics with the safety and security of 
the American people. . . . he went so far as to say that the Democrat-led Senate is 
“not interested in the security of the American people.”. . . 
  This is not how a great nation should debate issues of war and peace.  To    
 question people’s patriotism for simply raising questions about how a war is to be 
fought and won—to say that anybody who doesn’t  support the president’s 
particular policy on national security is against national security—is not only 
insulting, it’s immoral. . . .  
But the statements by the president and the vice president only serve to . . . 
undermine trust and thwart cooperation.  If Mr. Bush and his party continue to use 
the war as a political weapon, our efforts to address the threat posed by Iraq will 
fail (p.  A31) 
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Conceptually speaking, Gephardt and other elites who shared his views seemingly 
insinuated that the president’s partisan demagoguery was not only distasteful and 
shortsighted but also constituted a dereliction of presidential duty. The president’s 
partisan demagoguery constituted an abdication of his responsibility to be a sober 
constitutional officer who facilitates deliberative policymaking between the various 
branches of government particularly regarding “issues of war and peace” (Gephardt, 
2002, p.  A31; Tulis, 1987). 
Dimension 
 Within this population of writings, the president was repeatedly suspected or 
accused of partisan antagonism towards political dissenters (“Germany Speaks,” 2002; 
Krugman, 2002b; Rich, 2002b).  Even when the president was seemingly pursuing policy 
internally through institutional channels in Congress and the United Nations, his actions 
were perceived to be marred by external tactics that seemed to be designed to pressure, 
discredit or circumvent institutions like Congress and the United Nations by a significant 
number of elites (Byrd, 2002; Gepherdt, 2002).  As a result, the overall characterization 
for this body of writings was scored as high on partisan demagoguery property.  
Presidential Contempt Toward The Integrity & Prerogatives Of Congress & U.N. 
Security Council 
When this data was “constructed” into a narrative of interpretive abstraction in 
order to deduce the conceptual meaning and significance of the properties of the second 
major thematic pattern, a significant subcategory emerged (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  The 
subcategory that emerged was the notion of presidential contempt for the integrity and 
prerogatives of Congress and the Security Council as it related to deliberations over Iraq 
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policy, and this subcategory and in turn its parent overarching theme are defined by 
properties such as presidential duplicity, presidential coercive impatience, and 
presidential partisan demagoguery.       
 One of the strongest and most persuasive sentiments in this collection of elite 
writings was the need for sober, patient, and thoughtful deliberation regarding the Iraqi 
threat between the president, Congress, the U.N. Security Council, and the American 
populace, and the quality of the president’s leadership would judged on whether his 
leadership facilitated or undermined sober, patient, and thoughtful deliberations among 
these groups. When one abstracts from the data in order to discern conceptual meaning 
and significance, one gets the sense that this community of elites had constructed their 
understanding of the Iraqi controversy within the confines of a bargaining society where 
reciprocity, tolerance, and deliberation were the governing norms (Kernell, 1997; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998).  In other words, if genuine and inclusive deliberation was to take place 
among parties that have longstanding relationships with each other then each party had to 
respect the integrity, prerogatives, sentiments, and interests of the other bargaining 
partners.  In the estimation of a significant number of elites within this population, the 
president, despite prior presidential statements to the contrary, had established a 
consistent record of enmity towards the norms of humility, tolerance, reciprocity, shared 
responsibility, and deliberation across a wide range of domestic and foreign issues. 
 According to this expressed elite perspective, if the president was serious about 
adopting a collegial approach to the Iraqi threat, he might have regarded “United Nations 
as more than a distraction” given the fact that “for a lot of countries it [United Nations] is 
the closest thing to feeling enfranchised in world affairs” (Keller, 2002, p.  A19). Instead, 
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the president was “treating it [United Nations] with undisguised petulance” (Keller, 2002, 
p.  A19).  Thus, no one should be surprised that the international community perceives “a 
certain degree of imperial contempt for the rest of the world . . . . oozing” from President 
Bush’s deliberations at the United Nations (Friedman, 2002a, p.  A27).  In a column 
entitled The Jack Welch War Plan, Columnist Frank Rich (2002b) argued that the 
president’s longstanding record of contempt for the independent prerogatives of Congress 
was analogous to the contempt some business chief executives demonstrated towards the 
independent responsibilities and prerogatives of their respective corporate boards and this 
presidential contempt was bound to be reflected in the president’s congressional relations 
regarding Iraq:  
. . . this presidency is all of one consistent piece, whether it is managing our 
money or managing a war.  Now, as pre-9/11, it reflects the C.E.O. ethos of the 
1990’s bubble . . . . Two weeks before his inauguration, Mr. Bush invited Jack 
Welch, Ken Lay and a bevy of C.E.O.’s down to Texas, and he has always run the 
White House by the cardinal rules in their playbook.  A chief executive can do no 
wrong. The directors (for which read Republicans in Congress) and outside 
directors (that would be the Democrats) are expected to give him a blank check 
and question nothing. . . (p.  A17)     
Based upon this perceived pattern of past presidential disposition and behavior, Rich 
(2002b) anticipated to his chagrin that the president will continue to exemplify a 
contemptuous disposition towards Congress even though this model of leadership had 
been “discredited”: 
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Now that we know that this model was a sham . . . you would think the Bush 
Administration might revisit it.  But instead it is following a discredited modus 
operandi more slavishly than ever, even as it prepares to fight a new war.   
(p.  A17)  
 Thus, once again the data seemingly confirm Neustadt’s (1990) contention that a 
president’s professional reputation is largely based upon retrospective perceptions of 
perceived patterns in past presidential disposition and behavior.  In this case, the above 
quotations give voice to an emerging sentiment among elites that given the president’s 
track record it is reasonably to suspect that the president felt contempt towards the 
prerogatives of Congress and the United Nations, and as result of this contempt, there 
was considerable suspicion about the sincerity of the president’s commitment to collegial 
diplomacy as a means to “exhaust peaceful approaches before advocating war”(“Testing 
Iraq on Arms Inspectors,” 2002, p.  A30).    
In sum, the prevailing sentiment of these elites put forth the notion that the 
president’s leadership style or approach was critical to determining the ultimate policy 
outcome.  A clear majority believed that all diplomatic measures should be exhausted 
before resorting to war. The prevailing belief among these elites was that collegiality by 
the president was essential to facilitating the type of deliberation, consensus, and 
collaboration necessary for diplomatic success.  Demonstrations of presidential 
leadership that were perceived to be inimical to diplomatic success were ridiculed and 
engendered skepticism about the president’s commitment and capacity to resolve the 
Iraqi threat peacefully. The president’s professional reputation suffered as a result.     
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
Conceptual Significance Of Overarching Theme 
The overarching thematic pattern that emerged from this population of opinion 
writings in The New York Times was following: The president made a “forceful” case that 
Iraq was governed by a rogue regime that possessed illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 and in subsequent 
statements, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case that the Iraqi regime 
was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived policy preference of 
immediate preemptive military action.  
  Based upon the evidence and reasoning showcased in the president’s threat 
assessment, the president misdiagnosed the Iraqi threat. He also mischaracterized the 
nature of the Iraqi threat by attributing a level of urgency to it that was unwarranted.  The 
president seemingly failed to recognize or acknowledge the possible unintended 
consequences that might be unleashed by a premature move to war.  In light of these 
deficiencies, the president’s recommendation or policy prescription of war against Iraq 
was unjustified. The president’s recommendation of war is not only premature but also 
dangerously reckless and irresponsible.  Taken altogether, this population of political 
elites seemingly had negative orientation towards the president’s professional reputation 
as it related to his stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002.      
 The analytical or conceptual significance of this pervasive sentiment towards the 
president’s professional reputation regarding his stewardship of U.S. policy towards Iraq 
in fall of 2002 is three-fold.   
93 
  
 
First, a close examination of the data seems to reveal implicit suggestions of 
presidential incompetence as it related to the threat posed by Iraq.  The idea being that the 
president demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of the multifaceted nature of the 
Iraqi issue.  For example, there were serious and widespread misgivings about how the 
president analyzed and characterized the threat from Iraq.  There seemed to be a 
consensus view among elites that the evidentiary premises of the president’s ideological 
policy analysis were dubious at best, and presidential reasoning that was derived from 
those questionable premises was seriously and dangerously flawed.  Why was the 
president erroneously suggesting that the threats from Saddam and Al Qaeda were 
actually one and the same (Benjamin, 2002)?  Why did the president seemingly lack an 
appreciation for the potential pitfalls, ramifications, and uncertainties of war (Herbert, 
2002; Kristof, 2002)?  There was considerable unease about the possibility that Iraq was 
distracting the president from more pressing threats like Al Qaeda (Albright, 2002; “Iraqi 
Chessboard,” 2002; Jundt, 2002).   
Second, the data suggests that this community of political elites believed or was 
beginning to believe that the president’s policy argumentation was not simply flawed, 
misguided, or disingenuous but rather constituted a dereliction of presidential duty that 
unnecessarily imperiled the nation’s international prestige, security, and future prospects. 
Mark Danner, a contributor to The New Yorker magazine and a faculty member at the 
University of California at Berkeley, wrote an opinion-editorial entitled The Struggles of 
Democracy & Empire (2002) where he blamed the president’s duplicitous policy 
argumentation for facilitating a false and ill-formed national debate regarding Iraq: 
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In promoting the Iraq expedition as a necessary response to an immediate terrorist  
threat, however, they [the Bush Administration] have failed to prepare the 
American public for what looks to be a long and costly engagement in the Middle 
East.  Much of the confusion surrounding the Iraq debate thus far is owed to the 
justifications proffered and the more elaborate geopolitical enterprise motivating 
many in the Bush administration. (p.  A27)  
Danner’s remarks touched on a seemingly growing suspicion, even at this early 
stage of the controversy, that the president was irresponsibly manipulating the data and 
the national debate in order to surreptitiously advance an ulterior political agenda (Dowd, 
2002a; Krugman, 2002a, 2002b). Even though it was only in its embryonic phases, the 
mere insinuation that the president of the United States was peddling “false data” 
involving national security and regarded “facts as malleable” in order to support his 
shifting rationales on Iraq policy, is a serious condemnation of presidential character, 
particularly in the post-9/11 era, and a early warning sign of the fragile state of the 
president’s standing within the political establishment (Krugman, 2002b, p.  A35; Rich, 
2002a, p.  A15). The fact that these types of insidious insinuations emerged rather early 
in the time frame of this study suggests that contextual factors prior and surrounding the 
scope of this study were having an impact the president’s professional reputation 
regarding Iraq.    
 Danner (2002) indicted the president’s leadership for the clouds of suspicion 
hovering over his policy and for irresponsibly embarking an ill-prepared and divided 
nation on an audacious and treacherous adventure in Iraq: 
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Thus far, he [President Bush] has abdicated his responsibility to build the political 
support he will need to shape Iraq, and the Middle East, that will follow Saddam 
Hussein. 
 For America, the great risk of this new crusade is that the political will 
might be lacking to carry it out – that the public, unprepared for the imperial 
ambitions about to play out in the Middle East, will quickly lose heart if the 
project comes to grief; that after the inevitable setbacks and perhaps after further 
attacks at home, the occupation will grow unpopular and that even those in the 
administration whose vision is not so ambitious will want to cut and run, leaving 
ruin once more in America’s wake.  (p.  A27)   
John Dower (2002) who won a Pulitzer Prize for a book that documented 
America’s occupation of Japan after the Second World War noted in an opinion-editorial 
entitled Lessons From Japan About War’s Aftermath that the president’s attempts to 
analogize his policy towards Iraq with America’s successful defeat and occupation of 
Japan revealed not only a lack of understanding of history  and a failure to fully 
appreciate the complexity and range of potential consequences associated with a military 
conquest and occupation of Iraq but also a kind of hubris that would cause the president 
to imperil the nation’s security through overreach. 
Third, the widespread unease and skepticism towards the president’s stewardship 
of Iraq policy within this population of elite opinion writings was an early indication that 
many elites were inclined to challenge rather than support the president in the event that 
he went forward with his policy of preemptive war and experienced difficulties.  One 
would think that the pervasiveness of this skepticism regarding his leadership would have 
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ignited presidential concern as he embarked upon his controversial policy and created 
major incentives for presidential rapprochement with the political establishment given the 
fact that squabbling amongst mainstream elites over a controversial and salient 
presidential policy dramatically increases the likelihood that the president and his policy 
will receive unfavorable press, which could serve as a catalyst for public dissatisfaction 
with his policy (DeClerico, 2000; McCartney, 1994; Perloff, 1998).  In a future study, 
one might investigate whether the administration actually had these concerns, and if so, 
what were their strategies to address them. 
Second Major Theme 
The conceptual name of the second thematic category was elite skepticism of 
presidential commitment. This category signified the considerable amount of elite 
skepticism regarding the authenticity of the president’s commitment to pursue a peaceful 
resolution to the Iraqi threat through collegial consultations with Congress and the United 
Nations Security Council before resorting to armed conflict.  In fact, a significant 
segment of elites gradually seemed to have coalesced around the suspicion that the 
president’s ulterior motivation for collegial enterprises with Congress and the Security 
Council was to obtain politically expedient legitimacy for a virtually preordained armed 
invasion against Iraq (Kristof, 2002b). The defining properties of this thematic category 
were presidential duplicity, presidential coercive impatience, presidential partisan 
demagoguery, and presidential contempt.     
 The conceptual significance of this discovery is that it seemingly lends credence 
to the contention that many contemporary dilemmas in presidential leadership are the 
result of the contradictory fault lines in the political development of the presidency 
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(Tulis, 1998).  The modern president is expected despite inherent contradictions to 
seamlessly oscillate between the roles of an energetic proponent of presidential 
prerogative and power through the formulation, promotion, and implementation of a 
partisan policy agenda and a sober and mostly unpartisan facilitator of deliberative 
policymaking amongst various constitutionally recognized policymakers (Tulis, 1984, 
1987, 1996).   
In the case of the Iraqi controversy, President Bush’s previous conduct as an 
energetic and partisan advocate for presidential prerogative and power in routine 
domestic and international affairs seemingly undercut some elites’ capacity to accept him 
as a sober and trustworthy vanguard of the national interest in the Iraqi crisis. The lack of 
trust in the president’s publicly stated commitment to collegial leadership was fueled in 
part by perceived hints of militaristic ulterior motives and a perceived presidential 
proclivity to use the Iraqi controversy for electoral advantage (“A Delicate Balance at the 
U.N.,” 2002; Rich, 2002b; “The Healthy Politics of Iraq,” 2002). The data also suggests 
that some elites possibly feared that the president would irresponsibly use their support of 
his leadership on the Iraqi controversy as a means to consolidate the president’s 
dominance in other more routine policy matters (Krugman, 2002a). Professional 
reputation may be a fruitful window into exploring the consequences of the presidency’s 
competing leadership orientations.    
Reputation Influenced By Perceptions Of Previous Presidential Performance 
Neustadt argued that constitutional structure and the contextual features of the 
political environment in which the president operates typically compel the president to 
collaborate with multiple institutions and constituencies in order to formulate, enact, and 
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implement policy, and he also observed that presidents must be aware of the potential 
costs of unilateral action to presidential power and reputation even in policy domains 
where the president seemingly has considerable constitutional authority to pursue his own 
policy preferences without external constraint (1990).   
On top of that, Neustadt claimed that the president must always be cognizant of 
the fact that elites who monitor or do business with the president constantly look for 
patterns in presidential behavior in an effort to accurately forecast future presidential 
performance, and these retrospective appraisals of presidential temperament and skill 
help elites make appropriate moves to secure their interests and policy preferences vis-à-
vis the president (1990).  
A close reading of these opinion pieces suggests that elite perceptions of President 
Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy were made in part through the prism of past 
presidential performance. To their chagrin, some elites thought they saw signs of 
duplicity, coercive impatience, partisan demagoguery, and contempt in the president’s 
current overtures to the Security Council and Congress regarding Iraq that were similar to 
previous or related action by the president.  Even at risk of attracting the ire of the 
president and his associates, some of these elites deemed that it was in their interest to 
disseminate their suspicions of the president to a wider community.  The fact that 
President Bush’s professional reputation seemingly was negatively impacted to a 
significant degree by elite suspicions regarding the president’s overtures to the Security 
Council and Congress gives preliminary credence to the existence of a retrospective 
dimension in Neustadt’s professional reputation concept.       
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Elite Orientation To President Bush’s Policy Argumentation 
In a work entitled All the President’s Words: The Bully Pulpit and the Creation of 
the Virtual Presidency, Carol Gelderman observed that to a significant degree 
presidential “policy is made by words . . . and words shape thought” (1997, p.  37).    The 
content within this collection of elite opinion writings regarding the president’s 
stewardship of Iraq policy during this initial phase of this public controversy indicated 
that the collective thought of these elites was as much a reaction to the president’s policy 
argumentation as it was to the president’s actions.  In fact given the privileged status that 
this collection of elites seemingly attributed to the president’s rhetoric, which was in 
accordance with many contemporary scholastic perspectives regarding the nature and 
management of the presidency, one’s analysis of elite perceptions regarding this 
president’s acumen over Iraq policy might benefit from the understanding that these elites 
seemed to conceptualize the president’s policy argumentation as “commensurate with 
action” (Hart, 1984, 1987; Waterman, Wright & St. Clair, 1999, p.  66).  This conceptual 
insight as a means of achieving a deeper understanding of elite opinion regarding the 
professional reputation of President Bush seems all the more compelling when one 
considers that the dominant theme that emerged from this collection writings was related 
directly to the president’s speechmaking.  This elite emphasis on the president’s 
management of discourse as a critical criterion in their assessment of the president’s 
professional reputation suggests that theories related to the intersection of presidential 
discourse, leadership, and constituency feedback might provide fruitful insight into the 
meaning and significance of the thematic patterns that emerged from the collection of 
elite writings investigated for this study.   
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The thematic sentiments expressed within this collection of elite opinion writings 
suggest that the dilapidated state of President Bush’s professional reputation as it related 
to his stewardship of Iraq policy could partly be the function of the polity’s convoluted, 
layered, and often contradictory orientations towards presidential leadership particularly 
as it pertains to presidential crisis discourse (Tulis, 1987).  According to the rhetorical 
presidency theory articulated by Jeffrey Tulis, the occupant of the modern presidency is 
expected, if he or she is to be regarded as a strong and vigorous leader, “to inspirit the 
nation” through the virtually constant use of popular (i.e. rhetoric meant for public 
consumption rather than simply rhetoric that has mass appeal) rhetoric particularly 
regarding public controversies of great national concern (Tulis, 1984, p.  100).  In a piece 
entitled The Decay of Presidential Rhetoric, Tulis noted,  
Since the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson popular or 
mass rhetoric has become a principal tool of presidential governance and the  
doctrine that a president ought to be a popular leader has become an unquestioned 
premise of our political culture.  Indeed, far from questioning popular leadership, 
intellectuals and columnists have embraced the concept and appear to be 
constantly calling for more or better presidential leadership of popular opinion 
(1984, p.  99). 
Yet, the modern presidency is also expected to honor one of the lasting yet often 
unacknowledged legacies of the Founding Fathers, which socialized succeeding 
generations of Americans through constitutional construction, institutional practice, and 
political tradition into adopting the perception of the president as a constitutional officer 
who is averse to popular opinion leadership and judiciously uses discourse to facilitate 
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deliberative and responsible policymaking between the executive and legislative branches 
of government (Tulis, 1984, 1987). 
In an elaboration of the tenets of rhetorical presidency theory, a significant 
segment of elites in their opinion writings regarding the president’s stewardship of Iraq 
policy seemingly recommended that President Bush adopt a model of leadership that 
somehow stirred, informed and managed public opinion and simultaneously insulated 
governmental leaders from public pressure that might undermine deliberation and 
responsible policymaking.  This sentiment seemingly failed to fully recognize or 
appreciate the difficulties in reconciling these seemingly contradictory aspirations, 
orientations, and modalities into a newly transcendent and principled form of presidential 
rhetorical leadership particularly given the rise of individual pluralism, political 
polarization, and mass media proliferation in the surrounding political environment 
(Tulis, 1996; Kernell, 1997).  Furthermore, if one accepts the existence and pervasiveness 
of this conflicted orientation towards presidential policy argumentation and the 
contextual developments that seemingly exacerbate internal tensions within that 
conflicted orientation, as suggested by rhetorical presidency theory, one might 
hypothesize that generally speaking the professional reputation of presidents regarding 
controversial issues like Iraq policy is likely to be held in low regard, which in turn could 
have significant and long lasting effects on the prestige and operation of presidential 
leadership. 
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Chapter 7 
Future Study 
Neustadt argued that the “echoes” of the president’s professional reputation could 
be heard in the columns of men like Krock and Reston who happened to write for The 
New York Times, and so based upon the criteria established by the author of the 
professional reputation concept, this study decided to use opinion pieces from The New 
York Times as its measure (1990, p.  53).  However, in an effort to alleviate concerns of 
ideological and geographical bias, a future researcher who is interested in investigating 
professional reputation  might want to draw his sample of writings from a cross section of 
national newspapers.       
  The general goal of this study was to determine elite perceptions of President 
Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002 through qualitative thematic 
analysis.  However, since this study was based entirely upon analysis of documents, 
analytical judgments regarding those elite perceptions can only be inferred from the data 
without the benefit crosschecking the veracity of those analytical judgments through 
interviews with the participants.  A future study based, at least in part, upon in-depth 
interviews with the opinion writers could potentially give us much greater insight into 
their appraisals of the president. 
 Neustadt contends, “Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it makes 
persuasion easier, or harder, or impossible” (1990, p.  53).  This study seems to indicate 
that elites had a negative view of President Bush’s professional reputation as it related to 
initial phase of his stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002, yet the president was 
able to successfully move forward with the enactment of his policy preferences.  An 
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potentially interesting research question for a future study would be why was the 
president, with a weak or negative professional reputation, able to secure at the 
conclusion of the initial phase (as specified by the time period this study) of Iraq 
controversy a congressional resolution that essentially authorized him to use force against 
Iraq at his own discretion and the controversial and internationally resisted U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1441, which was an ultimatum from the Security Council of the 
United Nations to Saddam to disclose his WMD program and disarm or “face the severest 
consequences”(Bush, 2002e, para. 1; Purdum, 2003)?  Furthermore, in order to get a 
deeper understanding of professional reputation and its importance, we need to design 
future studies that attempt to precisely measure professional reputation’s impact upon 
policy.  More studies should build upon the work of Lockerbie and Borrelli who 
attempted to measure how perceptions of presidential skill impacted congressional roll 
call votes (1989).      
 Additional study is needed to more definitively determine whether or not elite 
perceptions of professional reputation are routinely and significantly impacted by a 
pervasive and conflicted orientation towards presidential policy argumentation, as 
suggested by rhetorical presidency theory.  
The perceptions regarding President Bush’s professional reputation seemed to be 
rooted in large part in the idea that the president was derelict in the performance of his 
presidential duties.  One might consider the president’s “dereliction of duty” to be a 
prime consequence of the tension created by the “layered” political development of the 
presidency whereby the contemporary political environment superimposes expectations 
of vigorous presidential stewardship of a partisan policy agenda onto the presidency’s 
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institutional structure and founding mores, which traditionally instructs the president to 
emphasize his or her role as a deliberative and relatively unpartisan facilitator of policy 
(Tulis, 1996, 1998).  If one accepts Tulis’ argument, then perhaps the perceived 
shortcomings of President Bush’s professional reputation were more the result of 
structural contradictions within the political environment and the institutional presidency 
than the result of personal deficiencies in leadership capacity on the part of the president.  
If a future researcher would like to study the professional reputation concept qualitatively 
through the case study format similar to the one utilized for the current study, the 
significance and meaning of the findings could be greatly enhanced by a more refined 
and disciplined explication of the surrounding contextual variables and dimensions, 
which would increase the likelihood of a more precise determination regarding the 
salience and impact of structural or environmental variables to elite perceptions of 
presidential reputation. A richer explication of the surrounding context in which the 
investigated controversy is embedded may give the analyst greater insight into how much 
weight elites assign to personal qualities versus contextual factors in their evaluations of 
a president’s professional reputation.         
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Table 1: Major Thematic Categories 
Thematic Category Property Property Property 
policy 
argumentation 
 
Ideology  Evidence unintended 
consequences 
elite skepticism of 
presidential 
commitment to 
collegiality & 
diplomacy 
Presidential 
duplicity 
presidential coercive 
impatience 
partisan 
demagoguery 
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